WPCAV }&E/P(v1B| ?S@)YP'tV;&1) 06GE qd@k_zDӍc;#zQ c6hO )aExC0\fN<.nm_D FV['^n:U OcV֊SK#6r~f0 aOݺaaXhQ@Gj󭵄5TϢlÉcoiXKe̺.9VB>۩"kݝؗ &8$@rdO~}~`ڮuWG1l$wR%1K+y?@B,s%LSPAgupY7VVN4d9zڊ&O)"`lOuI!Ǹ0AWpa"ɼpGVS罆)!!o~nXCFB43)5 0\9 0D: 0); < 0? 0? 0@ 0A 0yB 0UC 0.D 0E 0E 0F 0tG 0>H 0I 0I 0J 0|K 0QL 0#M 0M 0N 0O 0MP 0<Q 0LQ 0BQ 0YR B-kRU>RNR$g 72g 0cgJ;h)jblnm0~mrm nn9oospps{/ЃW>ن$Ӎ Bbn+n6 =Ŝ LXˤ 1\?\cZnbQ\H\)V}۸X-/}c NX^)Bv!\dK \j%{DhkdTnn&;~}z~zzz53rE\Y%~C(C+EC |MkW 72 0w# 0 0$ 0 0x 0? 0 0D M " 00]# 0<# 0# 0>$ 0v$ 0`;% 0`% 0`% 0`[& 0`& 08' 0S' 02%( 0W( 0:S) 0_) 0 ) 0j* 0`, B*- D/. D+=. 0h. D// 00 060 01 0:'2 0^a2 0<2U62U*13x[3N33h4{4 1n595.7J7?8xC9p9|+::);";<<Q== '@(3@t[@l@;A;A;AX=BnBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCVCCCCCCCCCCCCnqCnCCCCCMDMDMDMDMDMDRERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERENF\bFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFbFFFFFFFFFFFL?JMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM4NNNNNNNUJPRTTTTTTTTTTTTTTvTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUgUPUNEC SuperScript 8600(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,0=, 9+DԤ3.xU q  ($USUS.,    100    _S&Bat35.(.(3($ !USUS.,      0  (#$  0    ($USUS.,    19    _Seegenerally_ICANNWatch.org_3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a) p  ($USUS.,    27    _SeeS&Bat   ($USUS.,    36    _Thedispositionofthe.usccTLDisanotablerecentexampleoftheUSusingitspower  overtherootdirectly.Seeinfratextatnotes.  ($USUS.,    52    _S&Bp.8(italicsinoriginal).InfactIdiscussedthisissue,notablyatpages6465. a  ($USUS.,    37    _Thisisexpressedinthe_MOU_,the_CRADA_,andwasrecentlyreiteratedinadenialofa  petition  ԀforrulemakingsignedbyDoCActingAssistantSecretaryforCommunicationsand  InformationJohnF._Sopko_.See_ICANNWatch.org_,CommerceDept:WeDon'tDoTLDs,  4 O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=2376:ON   7 |Ԁ(July8,2001)(quotingletterdenyingpetitionfor t rulemaking).http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=237(O$  ($USUS.,    41    _Moststrikingly,the$50,000nonrefundableapplicationfeeforwouldbenewgTLD  registries.2G+J 0_level1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  ..  2( 4 <DL2    ($USUS.,    56    _BrianCarpenter,IABTechnicalCommentontheUniqueDNSRoot,RFC2826,  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2826.txt?number=2826.   ($USUS.,    89    _IusethewordadjudicatehereintheAPAsense;onemightdescribetheproceeding  whenICANNselectednewTLDstringsandregistriesasanadjudication,oronecouldcallita  hearingthatproducedadraftrulelateradoptedbyDoC.Whicheveritwas,theproceedingwasa  shambles,andthedistinctionisofnoimportancetotheconstitutionalquestionofwhetherDoC t couldlegallyadoptICANNsconclusionswithoutaproperAPAprocedureofitsown.Iamnot ` herereferringtotheUDRP,whichisadifferentsortofadjudication.IdonotthinkUDRP L  arbitratorsshouldtobefoundtobestateactors,althoughthereissuggestivelanguagein 8  AmericanManufacturersMutualInsuranceCo.v.Sullivan,526U.S.40,54(1999);cfWrong $ t Turnat116n.430. z  ($USUS.,    43    _WrongTurnat.  ($USUS.,    44    _ICANNhasincreasedstaffingdevotedtothecareofccTLDs.2D+J 0_level2   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2   )  ($USUS.,    45    _ccTLDregistriescomplainthatICANNhasadoptedagoslowpolicyonentering  updatestoccTLDtechnicalinformation,sayingthatccTLDswhodonotsigncontractswith  ICANNcannotexpectbetterservice.See_CENTR_,Pressreleasefrom12th_CENTR_ԀGAin  Luxembourg,4A  O  5  http://www.centr.org/news/20012111.htm6O   7 6,Ԁ;JonWeinberg,ICANNand_CENTR_Ԁat t odds(Jan.7,2002),4B O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=5106"O6   7 d. [tocome._cx_] 2A+J 0_level3   ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2>+J 0_level4  ` &<<DL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2;+J 0_level5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2     ($USUS.,    47    _See_ICANNWatch.org_,Theothershoedrops,II(orIII,...),  4fO  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=4286O   7Ԁ(Oct.26,2001),and_ICANNWatch.org_,The  OtherShoeDrops4g O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=3396O+   7dYԀ(Sept.5,2001).28+J 0_level6    DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  25+J 0_level7  h DDL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  22+J 0_level8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2/+J 0_level9    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levsl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levsl2   ," <DL,23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levsl3   ) <DL)23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levsl4  ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levsl5   #DL#23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levsl6    DL 23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levsl7  h DDL23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levsl8   L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levsl9    L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levnl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23   2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levnl2   ," <DL,23   2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levnl3   ) <DL)23   2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levnl4  ` &<<DL&23   2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levnl5   #DL#23   2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levnl6    DL 23   2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levnl7  h DDL23   2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levnl8   L23   2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levnl9    L23   2( 4 <DL2  <:Default Para<$$:footnote tex  XXX  <:footnote ref64Hyperlink    )Hairline d\  `&Times New Roman D_  (USUS.,    24    =XXXXForthefiscalyearendingJune30,1999,ICANNslegalexpensestotaled$687,163.:  :  @#XXX=Xf#  InternetCorporationforAssignedNamesandNumbers,FinancialReport(FiscalYearEnding  June30,1999)4? O  5  ;  http://www.icann.org/financials/financialreport_fye_Ԅ30jun99.htm;-  6  7 #.    =XXXXDuringthefiscalyearendingJune30,2000ICANNpaidatotalof$635,323.97inlegal t fees.#XXX=Xj#ThissumwascomputedusingamountsstatedintheminutesofseveralICANNexecutive ` boardmeetings.See4j ` O  5  ;  =XXXXhttp://www.icann.org/minutes/prelimreport10mar00.htm;  6  7 ; L  4k O  5  #XXX=X#;  http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes06apr00.htmq;  62  7 p. 8    =XXXXԀForthefiscalyearendingJune30,2001,ICANNslegalfeestoJones,Daytotaled $ t $576,224.63.#XXX=X#ThissumwascomputedusingamountsstatedintheminutesofseveralICANN  `  executiveboardmeetings.See4D O  5  ;  =XXXXhttp://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes30aug00.htm%;u   6 -   7 k Ԁand  4E O  5  #XXX=X #;  http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelimreport06jan01.htm ;K   6    7  Ԁ.=XXXX     Forthecurrentfiscalyear,ICANNhaspaidatotalof$272,572.28inlegalexpenses.  #XXX=Xt #ԀThissumwascomputedusingamountsstatedintheminutesofseveralICANNexecutiveboard t meetings.See4[ h O  5  ;  http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelimreport16aug01.htm;@  6    7 6; ` 4\ O  5  ;  http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelimreport16aug01.htm;  6g{  7 ;and L  4 O  5  http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelimreport16oct01.htm6O  7 @. 8    KarlAuerbachssuccessfulcampaignfortheNorthAmericanBoardseatfocusedon $ t ICANNsrelationshipwithJones,Dayandraisedquestionsofconflictofinterest.See,e.g.,Karl  ` Auerbach,Platform,ReformofICANN-FinancialReform,at  L   4_O  5  http://www.cavebear.com/ialc/platform.htm#financial-reform6POd  7_ .http://www.icann.org/financials/financial-report-fye-30jun99.htmi)(;3$2#  0  .3  0   @  ($USUS.,    20    _AlthoughtheSupremeCourtrefusedtoupholdtheD.C.Circuitsrevivalofthe  SchechternondelegationdoctrineinWhitmanv.AmericanTrucking_Ass'ns_,Inc,121_S.Ct_.903  (2001),itoverturnedthecourtofappeals'srelianceonSchechternondelegationintermsthatdid  notaffecttheCarterCoalbranchofthedoctrine.   ($USUS.,    11    _ManagementofInternetNamesandAddresses,63Fed.Reg.31,741(1998),  4 O  5  http://_www.ntia.doc.gov_/_ntiahome_/_domainname_/6_5_98dns.htm6O   7 Ԁ[hereinafterWhitePaper].http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-30aug00.htmhttp://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-06jan01.htm deniability DoChttp://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/reinvent.htm  ($USUS.,    29    _Inoteexamplesofthisbelow.  ($USUS.,    64    _WrongTurnat11325.  ($USUS.,    7    _SeeWrong_Turnat_Ԁn.398.  ($USUS.,    8    _WrongTurnatp.109. i  ($USUS.,    5    _ItscertainlynosecretthatIcametobeconcernedaboutthisquestionbecause,despite  havingoriginallybeenatepidICANNsupporter,Ihadcometobelievethatitwasmakingbad  choicesand,mostimportantly,actingwithoutregardforevenminimalproceduralregularity.I  usedexamplesofthesetoillustratemyarguments,althoughthesewereonlyafractionofthe t problemsdiscussed,inamorejournalisticfashion,ontheICANNWatchwebsite, ` 4] O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org6O   7 8 ,ofwhichIamaneditor.   ($USUS.,    65    _WrongTurnat113;seealsoDukeLawandTechnologyReview,AnInterviewWith  MichaelFroomkin,2001DukeL.&Tech.Rev.0001(Feb.28,2001)(inwhichIadmitthat"the  caseforfindingICANNtobeastateactoralthoughstrongisnotatallacertainty,especially  giventhecurrenttrendinthecaselawagainstfindingprivatebodiestobestateactorswithout t overwhelmingevidence.").Thisisnottheplacetorehashtheargumentsoverthestateaction ` precedents.SufficeittosaythatS&Bhaveaverycreativewaywithcases._Edmonson_,oneof L  theworstcasesfortheirview,theyessentiallyignore.AndtheirtreatmentofSan_Franscisco_ԀArts 8  andAthletics,Inc.v.UnitedStatesOlympicComm.,483U.S.522(1987).deservesanawardfor $ t chutzpah.ThecaseheldthattheUSOlympiccommitteewasnotastateactorbecausethe  ` necessaryelementofgovernmentcontrolwaslacking.Insteadoffocusingonthatissue,they  L  focusonthedollarvalueofICANNssupportfromtheUSgovernment.  8    Indeed,thereissomethingunintentionallytellinginS&B'sshelteringICANNbehindthe $  UnitedStatesOlympicCommittee.TheUSOC,itwillberecalled,waslaterrevealedtobea   deeplycorrupt,cronyridden,organization.SeeGeorgeJ.Mitchelletal.,ReportoftheSpecial    BidOversightCommission(Mar.1,1999);WrongTurnat176.ICANNneedsoversightto  ensureitdoesnotgothewayoftheUSOC.Currently,largelybyhistoricalaccident,thatrole  fallstotheUnitedStatesgovernment.   ($USUS.,    26    _GiventhatlegalexpenseshaveconsumedasubstantialfractionofICANNstotal  revenuetodate,thatmightnotbesobad:  Year0  0` (#(#_Buget_0 ` (#` (#  Legal0h (# (#  Legalas%oftotalh(#h(# FY19990 ` $1,466,637$687,163.000` (#` (#46.85%t(#(# FY20000 ` $2,851,909$635,323.970` (#` (#22.28%`(#(# FY20010 ` $5,899,470$576,224.630` (#` (#09.77%L (#(# FY20020 ` $4,530,000*0` (#` (#$272,572.28**0(#(#06.02%8 (#(# *(projected)  ` **(todate) %  ($USUS.,    2    _A.MichaelFroomkin,WrongTurnInCyberspace:UsingICANNToRouteAroundThe  APAAndTheConstitution,50 DukeL.J. 17(2000)(hereinafterWrongTurn).   ($USUS.,    4    _Thesameresultsmighthaveemergedfromatraditionalregulatoryprocess,butthenthe  peoplemakingthosedecisionswouldhavebeenaccountabletothepoliticalprocess,andtheright  ofaggrievedpartiestoseekjudicialreviewwouldbewelldefined.    Meanwhile,thebehavioroffirmsthatlobbyICANNasifitwereagovernmentbody, t turnsouttohaveantitrustimplications.SeeA.MichaelFroomkin&Mark_Lemley_,ICANN& ` _AntiTrust_(forthcoming).   ($USUS.,    3    _Asnotedbelow,thepoliticalalbeitnottechnical,positionoftheccTLDregistriesdiffers  slightlyfromthatofotherparticipantsinthesystem. M  ($USUS.,    12    _Subject,again,toantitrustconstraints,seeFroomkin&_Lemley_,supra.WhetherDoC  hastheauthoritytoreleaseitsholdontheDNSisdisputed.SeeWrongTurn@.   ($USUS.,    15    _Carterv.CarterCoal,298U.S.238(1936).  ($USUS.,    16    _A.L.A.SchechterPoultryCorp.v.UnitedStates,295U.S.495(1935).   ($USUS.,    23    _See,forexample,thefulminationsofICANNBoardMemberKarlAuerbachKarl  Auerbach,Platform:ReformofICANN-JonesDayMustGo,  4 O  5  http://www.cavebear.com/ialc/platform.htm#reform-jdmg6O%   7 SԀ  ($USUS.,    13    _SeeWrongTurnat34n.47. [updatecoming]    ($USUS.,    14    _SeeA.MichaelFroomkin,CommentsonProposedChangestoICANNByLaws(Oct.  22,1999),4 O  5  http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/bylaw-amend-comment.htm;6O   7 Ԁ_A.Michael_ԀFroomkin,  ICANNandIndividuals(Oct.25,1999),http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/individuals.htm;see  also_ICANNWatch_,DoesICANNHaveMembers?(Feb.20,2001), t 4 O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=36O   7 .  ($USUS.,    17    _SeeWrongTurn@146153. d  ($USUS.,    18    _SeeWrong_Turnat_Ԁ155.http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16aug01.htmhttp://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16aug01.htmhttp://www.icannwatch.org,  ($USUS.,    30    _Somehow,inICANNspeak,whatitdoesalwayshasconsensus.Thosewhodisagree  withICANN"havefailedtoachieveconsensussupport."TheburdenisneveronICANNto  proveconsensus,anditrarelybotherstoattempttoexplainhowitdiscernedit.UnlikeS&B,I  haveneverclaimed,anddontbelieveforasecond,thateveryoneagreeswithme.Anyrational t observerwouldhavetoagreethatthereisnotaconsensusregardingmany,most,maybealmost ` all,DNSmatters.BecauseICANN,anditsfrequentlypaidorfinanciallyinterestedapologists, L  wishtowrapthemselvesintheextralegalfigleafofinternationalconsensustheyarereducedto 8  makingfairlysillyclaims.SeegenerallyDavid_Farber_,MichaelFroomkin&DavidPost,Elusive $ t Consensus(7-21-99),4 VO  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/elusive_consensus.htm61OE   7 s;DavidPost,  ` ICANNandtheConsensusoftheInternetCommunity(8-20-99),  L  http://_www.icannwatch.org_/archive/_icann_and_the_consensus_of_the_community.htm_;DavidR.  8  Johnson&SusanP.Crawford,WhyConsensusMatters:TheTheoryUnderlyingICANN's $  MandatetoSetPolicyfortheDomainNameSystem(8-23-00),   4 O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/why_consensus_matters.htm6O   7 -;DavidR.Johnson&SusanP.   Crawford,WhatICANNConsensusShouldLookLike(9-5-00),   http://_www.icannwatch.org_/archive/_what_icann_consensus_should_look_like.htm_.     Foranattackontheentireconceptofrelianceonconsensus,seeCary_Coglianese_,Is p ConsensusanAppropriateBasisforRegulatoryPolicy?(2001),availableonlineat \ 4 O  5  http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=2704886 O    7 7 .   ($USUS.,    66    _Itsactuallyaslightlyinterestingquestion,sincetheAPAappliesto"eachauthorityof  theGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,whetherornotitiswithinorsubjecttoreviewbyanother  agency,"5U.S.C.551(1),butitsnotaquestionIaddressedinWrongTurn. }  ($USUS.,    67    _WrongTurnat94.   ($USUS.,    69    _AmendedComplaint,EricS.Boardv.BancoDeChile,C.A.No.CA01-1360-A(E.D.  Va.2002),4 2O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/essays/bord-complaint.htm;6O   7 Ԁseealso,ICANNWatch,A  VeryInterestingLawsuit,4 O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=5076O    7 7Ԁ(Jan.4,2002)  (discussingcomplaint).   ($USUS.,    72    _Afterafullprivatization,oneinwhichDoCnolongerhadanyongoingroleinDNS  rulemaking,therewouldofcoursebenoongoingnondelegationissue.Thereare,however,  somedifficultlegalquestionsastohowthishypotheticalfullprivatizationmightbemanaged  withoutauthorizinglegislation.SeeWrongTurnat32n.44.InanycaseDoCcontinuestosay t thatboththatithasnoplantorelinquishitspowersovertheDNS,andthatitdoesntparticularly ` wanttoexercisethem.Id.at31n.43.Exceptofcourse,whenitdoes.Seeinfranote1".us redelegation1104   L  (discussing.us_redelegation_ԀbyUSgovernment).  ($USUS.,    99    _See_eg_Ԁ_Gellhorn_Ԁcasebook.   ($USUS.,    21    _Thus,Iwrote:  8  [A]fewwordsaboutwhat[WrongTurn]isnotaboutmayalsobeinorder.  Opinionsdiffer--radically--astothewisdomofICANN'searlydecisions,  decisionswithimportantworldwideconsequences.Opinionsalsodifferasthe t adequacyofICANN's_decisionmaking_Ԁprocedures.Andmanylegitimatequestions ` havebeenraisedaboutICANN'sabilityorwillingnesstofollowitsownrules. L  WhetherICANNisgoodorbadfortheInternetandwhethertheU.S.government 8  shouldhavesuchapotentiallydominantroleoveracriticalInternetresourceare $ t  alsoimportantquestions.ThisArticleisnot,however,primarilyconcernedwith  anyofthesequestions.Norisitananalysisofthelegalityofactionstakenby  ICANN'sofficers,directors,oremployees....Despitetheirimportance,allof  theseissueswillappearonlytangentiallyinsofarastheyarerelevanttothecentral, t ifperhapsparochial,question:whetheraU.S.administrativeagencyis,orshould ` be,allowedtocallintobeingaprivatecorporationandthenlenditsufficient L  controloveragovernmentresourcesothatthecorporationcanusethatcontrol 8  effectivelytomakepolicydecisionsthattheagencycannot--ordaresnot--make $ t itself. `   8  AlthoughfocusedonDoC'sactions,thisArticlehasimplicationsforICANN.Ifthe  8  government'sactionsinrelationtoICANNareillegalorunconstitutional,then $  several--butperhapsnotall--ofICANN'spolicydecisionsareeithervoidor   voidable,andDoCmightreasonablybeenjoinedfromfurthercollaborationwith   ICANNinotherthancarefullydelineatedareas    WrongTurnat3637(footnotesomitted).AhqCEIMQUY]aAutoList1""""""""i)1)a)http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=428http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=339 Y  ($USUS.,    48    _SeeBrian_Kahin_,MakingPolicybySolicitation:TheOutsourcingof.us,  4n O  5  http://cip.umd.edu/Solicitation.doc6O   7 *;seealso_ICANNWatch.org_,.USgoesto_Neustar_,  4l O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=43864OH   7 vԀ(Nov.1,2001);DoCStakesOut_Maximalist_  Positionon.us,4o O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=2546vO   7 Ԁ(July17,2001).   ($USUS.,    42    _See,e.g._APTLD_Ԁ-AsiaPacificTopLevelDomains,LettertoMikeRoberts,  http://_www.isocnz.org.nz_/international/aptld000301letter-_funding.html_Ԁ(Mar.1,2000). http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-10mar00.htmhttp://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-06apr00.htmhttp://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=438   ($USUS.,    46    _SeeA.MichaelFroomkin,_ICANNWAtch.org_,HowICANNPolicyIsMade(II),  4pO  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/essays/dotau.htm6O   7*Ԁ(Sept.5,2001).http://cip.umd.edu/Solicitation.dochttp://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=254http://www.icannwatch.org/essays/dotau.htm s  ($USUS.,    49    _S&Batp.10.  ($USUS.,    32    _SeeMueller,DebrisofSelfRegulation.  ($USUS.,    40    _SeeFroomkin&_Lemley_,supranote.  ($USUS.,    50    _SeeWrongTurnat.  ($USUS.,    31    _OnICANNswaragainsttheconceptofdirectlyelectedmembersoftheBoard,see  Mueller,Weinberg. ~  ($USUS.,    54    _WrongTurnat45,6465.   ($USUS.,    55    _Personally,Ithinkthatfromalegalpointofviewthatdoubtwasresolvedearlier,when  PostelsIANAdisclaimedthepowertomakechangesintheroot,andNSIthereforedeclaredthat  theauthorityrestedintheUSgovernmentdirectly.SeeWrongTurnat6263.ButPostelsfailed  attemptcertainlydemonstratedtherealitiesofthesituation.Id. %  ($USUS.,    102    _See,e.g.,StevenL.Schooner,FearofOversight:theFundamentalFailureof  BusinesslikeGovernment,50Am._U.L._ԀRev.627(2001);AlanR.Burch,PurchasingtheRightto  Govern:_Winstar_andtheNeedto_Reconceptualize_ԀthelawofRegulatoryAgreements,88Ky.L.  J.245(19992000);Paul_Schiff_ԀBerman,CyberspaceandtheStateActionDebate:TheCultural t ValueofApplyingConstitutionalNormsto"Private"Regulation,71U.Col.L.Rev.1263 ` (2000). s  ($USUS.,    59    _S&Batfn24.   ($USUS.,    112    _Cf.Kenneth_Culp_ԀDavis,ANewApproachtoDelegation,36U.Chi._L.Rev_.713,713  (1969)("judicialinquiries[underthenondelegationdoctrine]shouldshiftfromstatutorystandards  toadministrativesafeguards").  ($USUS.,    51    _Seesupratextatnote}nominet1  .  ($USUS.,    39    _S&B'sdiscussionoftheUDRPcontainsanexampleofmoregeneralfeaturesoftheir  article.Intheirattemptto_marginalize_Ԁme,theysuggest(withoutafootnote)thatIwasthe  "lonely"dissenterontheWIPOCommitteeofExperts.S&Bp.17.Thetruthisthat_Laina_  _Raveendran_ԀGreene,anotherMemberWIPOofPanelofExpertsauthorizedmetonoteher t  agreementwiththesubstanceofmydissent,seeA.MichaelFroomkin,ACommentaryonWIPO's  TheManagementofInternetNamesandAddresses:IntellectualPropertyIssues,  http://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htmand_Harald_Ԁ_Tveit_Ԁ_Alvestrand_Ԁpublishedhis  ownpungentcomments._Harald_Ԁ_Tveit_Ԁ_Alvestrand_,"commentstotheWIPOprocessanditsresult" t 4~ O  5  http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/wiponote.html6O   7 6Ԁ(supportingUDRPinprinciplebutdisagreeingwith ` otherpartsofWIPOreport). Inanycase,itwouldhavebeenunsurprisingifIhadbeenthelone L  dissenter,sinceIwasalateadditiontothepanel,thesole"PublicInterestRepresentative"added 8  aboutathirdofthewayintotheprocessinresponsetoabarrageofcriticismthatWIPOhad $ t appointedacompletelyonesidedgroup.Intheevent,eventheonesidedpanelwastoo  ` interventionistforWIPOandtheytriedtokeepthedraftswesupposedtocommentawayfrom  L  us.SeeCommentary,supra,at4% O  5  http://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htm#_1_86nO   7 Z;A.  8  MichaelFroomkin,Semi-PrivateInternationalRulemaking:LessonsLearnedfromtheWIPO $  DomainNameProcess,bookchapterinChristopherT._Marsden_Ԁ(ed),RegulatingtheGlobal   InformationSociety211(2000),availableonline   4& O  5  http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/tprc99.pdf6 O    7  .nominethttp://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/wiponote.html   ($USUS.,    70    _OnesuchexceptiontotheAPAsreachappliestogovernmentcontracts.Seeinfratext  atnote7(contracts exception7?  . 8  ($USUS.,    58    _Onlythe"I,""K,"and"M"rootserversareoperatedinothercountries(Sweden,the  UnitedKingdom,andJapan,respectively).SeeDavidConradetal.,Root_Nameserver_ԀYear  2000Status,at4 O  5  http://www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/y2k-statement.htm6mO   7 ,atAppendixA.Of  thenon-federal-governmentalU.S.-basedservers,"C"isoperatedby_psi.net_,"D"bythe t  UniversityofMaryland,and"F"bytheInternetSoftwareConsortium(thegroupthatpublishes  BIND,seesupranote81).Theauthoritativelistat_ftp_://ftp.rs.internic.net/domain/named.root  reportsthatthe"J"rootserveris"temporarilyhousedatNSI(InterNIC)."Id.Othersources,  however,reportthatthestatusofthe"J"rootserverremainstobedetermined.See,e.g.,Conrad, t supra;Jun_Murai_,RootServerSystemAdvisoryCommittee,PresentationtoICANNPublic ` Meeting,Yokohama,Japan,slide6,_Berkman_ԀCenterforInternetandSociety,at L  http://_cyber.law.harvard.edu_/_icann_/_yokohama_/archive/presentations/_murai_-071500/_index.html_ 8  (July15,2000).[ updatecoming] http://www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/y2k-statement.htm   ($USUS.,    61    _See,e.g.JonathanWeinberg,_ICANNWatch.org_,BusyWiththeRoot,  4 O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=1426O   7 #Ԁ(May10,2001).http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=142 A  ($USUS.,    63    _ICANNBylaws43 O  5  http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm6tO   7 .  ($USUS.,    71    _S&Bputthesewordsinmymouthonp.5,withoutcitation.http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=507http://www.icannwatch.org/essays/bord-complaint.htm;   ($USUS.,    62    _SeeICANNBoardPreliminaryMinutes  http://_www.icann.org_/minutes/prelim-report-21jan02.htm#_RelationshipswithRootNameserverOpe  rators_Ԁ(ICANNBoardauthorizingpresidenttoenterinto_MOUs_Ԁwithrootserveroperators).The  statusofaMemorandumofUnderstandingisambiguousbecauseitmayormaynotbea t contractdependingonwhetherthereisanexchangeofconsideration,andwhethertheparties ` intendtobebound.An_MOU_Ԁis"Adocumentwhich,ifmeetingtheothercriteria,canbe,inlaw, L  acontract.Generally,intheworldofcommerceorinternationalnegotiations,a_MOU_Ԁis 8  consideredtobeapreliminarydocument;notacomprehensiveagreementbetweentwoparties $ t butratheraninterimorpartialagreementonsomeelements,insomecasesamereagreementin  ` principle,onwhichtherehasbeenaccord.Most_MOU_'simplythatsomethingmoreiseventually  L  expected."4 \O  5  http://www.duhaime.org/dict-m.htm6aOu   7 Ԁ;  8  ; 4 O  5  http://www.lawinfo.com/lawdictionary/dict-m.htm#MOU6BOV   7 Ԁhttp://www.duhaime.org/dict-m.htm }  ($USUS.,    1    __Nominet_Ԁ } ManagingDirectorWilliamBlack,whoisalsochairmanofthegeneralassembly  fortheCouncilofEuropeanNationalTop-LevelDomainRegistries(_CENTR_),anassociationof  Europeanregistries.4 O  5  http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2102780,00.html6O   7 .http://www.lawinfo.com/lawdictionary/dict-m.htm#MOU w  ($USUS.,    88    _S&Batpp.1719. Z  ($USUS.,    91    _SeeICANNBylawsatArt.IV(1)(b),4 nO  5  http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm#IV6O   7 !.http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16oct01.htmhttp://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2102780,00.html 1  ($USUS.,    60    _Inthiscontext,noteS&Batn.69isespeciallydisingenuous.Theclaimthatthe  governmentscontrolofthelegacyrootisnotmeaningfulbecausetheInternetcommunitycould  justchoosetorecognizeanother,a"decision[that][isnotsubjecttothecontrolof...the_USG_,"  isaclaimfalsifiedbytheUSgovernmentsdirectcontrolofrootservers.  ($USUS.,    110    _Ifthereissuchanumber,itislikelytobeverylarge.SeeWrongTurnat22n.12. t  ($USUS.,    73    _S&bpp.2324. s  ($USUS.,    78    _S&Batp.24. p  ($USUS.,    76    _S&Bp.24. t  ($USUS.,    77    _S&Bp.24n68. p  ($USUS.,    74    _S&Bp.23. p  ($USUS.,    75    _S&Bp.23.  ($USUS.,    80    _5U.S.C.551(13);seealsoWrongTurnat11013,13238. p  ($USUS.,    79    _S&Bp.23. z  ($USUS.,    81    _See  CooperativeAgreementNo.NCR-9218742,Amendment11,  http://_www.ntia.doc.gov_/_ntiahome_/_domainname_/proposals/docnsi100698.htm(Oct.6,1998).   ($USUS.,    86    _  OnenotableexampleisICANNsoriginalattempttocapture$1foralldomainname  registrations,seeWrongTurnatp.109.Morerecently,DoCforcedICANNtoamendthe  agreementitnegotiatedwithVeriSignrelatingtoitsobligationstodivestitselfofeitherits  registryorregistraroperations.SeeMartin_Kady_ԀII,CommercetoscrutinizeVeriSign'sgripon t Web,WashingtonBusinessJournal, ` http://_washington.bcentral.com_/_washington_/stories/2001/05/07/story4.html(May4,2001)(noting L  DoCsreviewbeginning);_ICANNWatch.org_,SPINCYCLE:CommerceReleaseonFinal 8  ICANN/VeriSignDomainNameRegistryDeal,4 O  5  http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=1596O    7 "8 $ t (May18,2001)(quotingDoCpressrelease). h  ($USUS.,    90    _Forexample,inIslandOnlineInc.v.NetworkSolutions,Inc.,119_F.Supp_.2d289  (_E.D.N.Y._,2000),therewasnosuggestionthatNSFhadorderedorevenhintedadesirefor  NSIspolicyrejectingobscenedomainnames.Indeed,itwasobviousthatthegovernmenthad  notimposedthisrequirement,sincethenameswere_registerable_Ԁviaotherregistrars.petitionhttp://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=159 O  ($USUS.,    82    _Seesupranote!petition!37  .ThatDoCmayhaveaparticularmotiveforitsdecisionmayaffect  thereasonablenessofthechoice,butitcannotaffecttheapplicabilityoftheAPA.   ($USUS.,    92    _Barrios-_Velazquez_Ԁv._Asociacion_Ԁde_Empleados_Ԁdel_Estado_ԀLibre_Asociado_ԀdePuerto  Rico,84F.3d487,493(1stCir.1996)(quotingRockwell,26F.3dat258). |  ($USUS.,    93    _SeeWrongTurnat118.contracts exception  ($USUS.,    83    _5_USC_Ԁ5U.S.C.553(a)(2). 9  ($USUS.,    84    _SeeWrongTurnat12629.OnemightalsoaskwhetherS&Barewisetorelyonacase  construingthereachofthebenefitspartoftheclausethatincludesthecontractsexception.  ($USUS.,    85    _Seesupranote'doc control'81  .  ($USUS.,    87    _SeeWrongTurnat12629.doc control ;  ($USUS.,    68    _ԀBivensv.SixUnknownFed.NarcoticsAgents,403U.S.388(1971).ICANNitselfis  safefroma1983challengebecauseitactsunderinstructionsfromafederalagency,notastate  oneand1983appliesonlytothoseactingunder"colorofstatelaw."ICANNisalsosafefrom  BivensactionsbecauseoftheSupremeCourtsdecisioninCorrectionalServicesCorp.v. t _Malesko_Ԁ122_S.Ct_.515(2001)(holdingthatBivensactionscanonlybebroughtagainst ` individuals,notcorporations),acasedecidedafterWrongTurnwaspublished. z  ($USUS.,    96    _SeeWrongTurnat.  ($USUS.,    94    _SeeWrongTurnat11819.AnarguablybettercaseforS&B'sposition,onethey  neglecttosite,mightbe_Register.com_,Inc.v._Verio_,Inc.,126_F.Supp_.2d238(_S.D.N.Y._,2000).  There,thedistrictcourtexaminedICANNsroleinregulatingtheconductofregistrarsviathe  ICANNAccreditationAgreementandconcludedthat  "ICANNisnotagovernmentalbody."Id. t at247.Thecourt,however,reachedthisconclusioninapeculiarfashion.Ratherthanapplying ` thetestsforstateorfederalactors,thecourtsimplyreasonedthatbecauseDoCsestablishmentof L  ICANNwasintendedtomove"awayfromnascentpublicregulationoftheInternetandtowarda 8  consensus-basedprivateorderingregime"andbecausetheWhitePaperwasonlyastatementof $ t policyratherthanasubstantiverule,itfollowedthat"theAccreditationAgreementrepresentsa  ` privatebargain"betweenICANNandtheaffectedregistrars.Id.at24748.PerhapsS&Bdonot  L  relyonitbecausetheyfoundthislogicalleapasunconvincingasIdo.  8    Casesrelatingtogovernmentsponsoredenterprisesofsomelimitedrelevance.Itseems $  fairlyclearthatICANNisnotafederal"agency"forpurposesof_FOIA_ԀortheGovernment   CorporationControlAct(GCCA)becauseitisneithera"governmentcontrolledcorporation"as   contemplatedbytheGCCAnorsome"orotherestablishmentintheexecutivebranchofthe   Government."5U.S.C.s552(e);cf.A.MichaelFroomkin,ReinventingtheGovernment   Corporation1995Ill.L.Rev.543,availableonline p 4G O  5  http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/reinvent.htm6{O   7 .Thetestinthesemattersiscontrolof \ thesortusedtomeasurecorporatecontrol,testswhichoftenfocusontherealityofcontrolas H muchastheform. 4   AslightlyharderquestioniswhetherICANNmightqualifyasan"authorityofthe  p GovernmentoftheUnitedStates"asthetermisusedintheAPA,inwhichcaseICANNwouldbe  \ an"agency"forAPApurposes.See5U.S.C.551(1);5U.S.C.701(b)(1).Bethatasitmay, H IdidnotmakethatargumentinWrongTurn.Asnotedabove,theactionableissueonwhich 4 WrongTurnfocusedwasthegovernmentsoutsourcingofregulatoryfunctionstoICANN,and   DoCsoftenunquestioningrelianceonICANNsdecisions. r  ($USUS.,    97    _S&Batp.1.  ($USUS.,    109    _SeeJonathanWeinberg(forthcoming).   ($USUS.,    57    _SeeWrongTurnatp.141.   ($USUS.,    95    _Take,forexample,S&B'sassertionthatICANN"neithersoughtnorreceivedapproval"  oftheUDRPfromtheU.S.government.Eveniftherewasnoofficialcommunicationarewe  seriouslyexpectedtobelievethatICANNstaffneverdiscussedthiswithBeckyBurr,ortheother  U.S.governmentofficialsinterestedinDNSpolicy?Inanycase,asIexplainedinWrongTurn, t thecriticalinstructiontoimposesomethingliketheUDRPwasintheDNSWhitePaper.See ` WrongTurnat2425,6970,96,110;ICANNStatusReporttotheDepartmentofCommerce, L   Iathttp://www.icann.org/statusreport-15june99.htm(June15,1999).ThatICANNinfactdid  whattheU.S.governmenttoldittodoisnotthegreatestevidenceofitsindependence.  ($USUS.,    111    _Thelistisillustrative,notexhaustive.e"(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#(xir$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2#(  0  )3  0 (# (#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2#(  a  )3  0h(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2#(   )3  0h(#h(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2#  0  )3  0(#(#({$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2#  a  )3  0p(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#2#     )3  0p(#p(#  x  ($USUS.,    104    _  SeeICANN,Announcement:_Redelegation_Ԁof.usCountry-CodeTop-LevelDomain  (Nov.19,2001),4  O  5  http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-19nov01.htm6O   7 FԀ(admitting  that"_redelegation_ԀoccurredbeforethecompletionofthenormalIANArequirements").  ($USUS.,    103    _S&Bat13(footnoteomitted).0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1   XXX   (&H2 XXX (&H3 XXX (&H4 XXX XXX(&H5 XXX (&H6 XXX 20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEK<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXS=\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis<:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXS=\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/K<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXS=\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7(X7  ?%2A`Arial?  XXXS=\  `&Times New RomanS7(X7&  d d)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7(X7  ?%2A`Arial?  XXXS=\  `&Times New RomanS7(X7)2dxd0KS.SampleK<6X9`(Courier NewKS=\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterK<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXS=\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  <6X9`(Courier New%2A`Arialhttp://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-19nov01.htm  ($USUS.,    9    _Seeinfranote+DoC overrules+86  .http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=270488 q  ($USUS.,    108    _S&Bp.14.AhsCEIMQUY]aAutoList3""""""""i)1)a) /  ($USUS.,    22    _SeeJoeSims&CynthiaL._Bauerly_,AResponsetoProfessorFroomkin:WhyICANN  DoesnotViolatetheAPAortheConstitution.[HereinafterS&B].DoC overrules  ($USUS.,    107    _Seesupratextatnotes!(discussionoffearof'breakingtheroot'). 5  ($USUS.,    28    _Asexplainedbelow,IdonotclaimthatICANNviolatestheAPA,ratherIclaimthatthe  USgovernmentviolatesitbyrelyingonICANN.Thisisnotatrivialdifference.Itisessential.http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/why_consensus_matters.htmhttp://www.icannwatch.org/archive/elusive_consensus.htm r  ($USUS.,    33    _S&Batn.15. x  ($USUS.,    34    _S&Btextatn.87.  ($USUS.,    105    _Seesupranote7(DoC's r.t. withdraw76  ..us redelegation   ($USUS.,    114    _Indeed,arguablythatismoreorlesswhatthedistrictcourtdidin_Register.com_,Inc.v.  _Verio_,Inc.,126_F.Supp_.2d238(_S.D.N.Y._,2000).Seesupranote verio94  . G  ($USUS.,    101    _Thenagain,"Countingpublishedcases...ismeaninglessinresolvingafact-intensive  question....Rather,theproperquestioniswhichcaseismostanalogous."_Pabst_Ԁv.OklahomaGas  &Electric,228F.3d1128,1134(10thCir.2000).Here,thatisCarterCoalandTexasBoll  WeevilEradicationFound.,Inc.v._Lewellen_,952S.W.2d454(Tex.1994).verioDoC's r.t. withdrawhttp://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htmhttp://www.cavebear.com/ialc/platform.htm#reform-jdmg  ($USUS.,    113    _Somesmallgainsmaybepossibleviaprivatelaw.SeeFroomkin&_Lemley_,supranote  Є.http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=3http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/bylaw-amend-comment.htm;ultra vireshttp://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm#IVhttp://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htm#_1_8http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/tprc99.pdf  ($USUS.,    35    _Seesupranote7(DoC's r.t. withdraw76  Հandinfranote'doc control'81  .  ($USUS.,    38    _Seesupranote7(DoC's r.t. withdraw76  .http://www.centr.org/news/20012111.htmhttp://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=510 w  ($USUS.,    106    _AccordingtoDoCin1999,"[_t]he_ԀauthoritativerootisoperatedbyNSIunderthe  directionofthe_U.S_Ԁgovernment."SeeCourtney_Macavinta_,C_NET.com_,ICANNtocontrol   domainnameserver(June30,1999),http://news.com.com/2100-1023-227889.html.Similarly,  NSI'sseniorvicepresidentDon_Telage.stated_,"Wewillonlyfollowexpresswrittendirection  fromtheDepartmentofCommerce,andiftheyweretotellmetotakethe[A-rootserver]and  shipittoMoscow,thenthat'swhereitwouldgo....Wewillcomply."Id. B  ($USUS.,    6    _  "IfDOCwithdrawsitsrecognitionofICANNoranysuccessorentitybyterminatingthis  Agreement,ICANNagreesthatitwillassigntoDOCanyrightsthatICANNhasinallexisting  contractswithregistriesandregistrars."MemorandumofUnderstanding(_MOU_)betweenthe  DepartmentofCommerce(DOC)andtheInternetCorporationforAssignedNamesandNumbers t (ICANN),AMENDMENT1, ` http://_www.ntia.doc.gov_/_ntiahome_/_domainname_/agreements/amend1-_jpamou.htm_Ԁ5.  ($USUS.,    10    _SeeWrongTurnat31n.43. *  ($USUS.,    25    _=XXXXIfJonesDayisorganizedlikemanymajorUSlawfirms,thebillingpartnerearnsa  disproportionateshareofthesefees,eitherdirectlyorindirectlywhenitinfluencesthe  computationofhisannualpartnershipshare;evenifitisnot,theabilitytoattract(or,inthiscase,  create)andretainclientsisprized.#XXX=Xf# K  ($USUS.,    98    _S&Batp.3.Here,S&Bareingoodcompany,astheGAOalsoadvancedthis  argument.LetterfromRobertP.Murphy,GeneralCounsel,GeneralAccountingOffice,toSen.  _Judd_ԀGregg,Chairman,UnitedStatesSenateSubcommitteeonCommerce,Justice,State,andthe  Judiciary26&n.41(July7,2000),4 O  5  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/og00033.pdf6O   7 /Ԁ("Sinceitisa t rolenotspecificallyrequiredbystatute,theDepartmentwasnotdelegatingortransferringa ` statutorydutywhenitproposedtotransitionadministrativecontroloverthedomainnamesystem L  toaprivateentity.").OneofmygoalsinWrongTurnwastoexplainhowtheGAOerredinthis 8  assertion.http://www.gao.gov/new.items/og00033.pdfhttp://www.cavebear.com/ialc/platform.htm#financial-reform  ($USUS.,    53    _Seeinfratextatnotes.http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm !USUS.,  _8XXdd8@ FormandSubstanceinCyberspace   @!A.MichaelFroomkin   [isanintroorabstractrequired?]  t 8  "Wedon'tknowwhat(ICANN)istherefor,"_  #  1      _L    A. $ t   WrongTurnInCyberspaceOT  #  2      ׀hadtwobasicgoals,onedescriptive,theotheranalyticaland  L  persuasive.ThefirstgoalwastodescribehowtheDepartmentofCommerce(DoC)employeda  8  novelpieceoflegalsleightofhandtoachievecertainoutcomesregardingthemanagementofthe $  DomainNameSystem,akeyInternetresource.Thus,WrongTurncarefullyexplained,andwith   theencouragementoftheDukeLawJournalstaffperhapsoverfootnoted,thestoryofhowthe   UnitedStatescametofinditselfcontrollingtherootoftheDomainNameSystem(DNS)relied   onbytheoverwhelmingmajorityofInternetusers.TheAdministration,andparticularlyaninter   agencygroupheadedbySeniorPresidentialAdvisorIra_Magaziner_,soonfounditselffacedwith p conflictingandirreconcilabledemandsbetweenInternetpeoplesuchasJonPostelwhowantedto \ createalargenumberofnewtopleveldomains(TLDs),andassertivetrademarkandintellectual H propertyinterestswhostronglyopposedthisandtowhomtheAdministrationwasheavily 4 beholden.  p   Initsefforttoescapethisseemingimpasse,_Magaziner_ԀandDoCachievedtheparadoxical H featofkeepingultimatecontrolovertheDNSwhilemaximizingthegovernmentsdeniabilityand 4 distancefromthewayinwhichtheDNSismanaged;insodoingDoCcreatedaschemeinwhich   itand/oritsagentcanmakedefactorulesthatapplytoalltheUS(andmostforeignQ  #  3      )participants   intheDNSdespitetheabsenceofstatutoryauthorityfromCongress.Theresultwasan  institution,theInternetCorporationforAssignedNamesandNumbers(ICANN),thatis  increasinglyabletoimposeitswillontoregulatedomainnameregistrars,registries,and   registrants,andhasdonesoinwaysthatfrequentlybenefitthetrademarklobbyandICANN l insiders.P  #  4      ׀     ICANNis,inform,aprivatenonprofitCaliforniacorporationandaUSgovernment  contractor.ButtheformoftheUSgovernmentsrelationshipwithICANNisunusual,andthe t substanceunique.ThefactssetoutinWrongTurndemonstratethattheUSgovernmentisthe ` butforcauseofICANNsexistence,ofICANNsrecognitionbyotherrelevantactors,of L  ICANNsabilitytoexactrevenuesfromregistrarsandregistries,andindeedofICANNs 8  continuingexistenceandrelevance.WrongTurnrelatedeachoftheseelementsoftherelationship $ t inperhapstediousdetail,includinghowICANNandtheUSgovernmenthaveenteredintothree  ` differentcontractswiththeUSgovernment.IntheseagreementstheUSgovernmentlends  L  ICANNpowerovertheDNS,andICANNprovideswhatamounttoregulatoryservicesforthe  8  government.WrongTurnarguedthatthesefactshad,orshouldhave,legaleffectsbecauseeven $  thoughtheformofICANNsrelationshipwiththeU.S.iscarefullycraftedtodisguiseit,the   substanceoftheUSICANNrelationshipistohaveDoCrelyonICANNtoregulatewherethe   governmentfearsorisunabletotread.     WrongTurnalsoarguedthat,atleastfromaparochial,UScentric,administrativelaw p pointofview,ICANNisaterribleprecedentbecauseitunderminestheaccountabilitywehavea \ righttoexpectshouldaccompanytheuseofpublicpower.Byvestingdefactoregulatorypower H inaprivatebody,DoCinsulatesdecisionsabouttheDNSfromtheobligations(e.g.openness,due 4 process)andconstraints(e.g.conflictsofinterest,judicialreviewforproceduralregularityandfor  p reasonableness)thatcommonlyapplytoexercisesofpublicpower.L  #  5      ׀Indeednowthat,thanksin  \ largeparttotheenergeticinterventionoftheUSgovernment,ICANNhassecureditselfaregular H andcontractuallyguaranteedincomestreamfromtheentitiesitregulates,itisinpracticesubject 4 toonlyonerealisticexternalconstraint:whateverdisciplineisimposedbyUSgovernment    oversight,andthebackgroundthreatoftheUSgovernmentexercisingitsrighttotakebackall   thepowersandfunctionsithasbestowedonICANN._m  #  6      _    XX  WrongTurnssecondgoalwastoexplorethelegaltheoriesthatcouldand,Iargued,  shouldbeusedtorightthisdeparturefromadministrativeregularity.Thekeyconceptualmove t wastofocusthelegalargumentonthegovernmentsroleinDNSpolicyratherthanonwhat ` ICANNdid.AsnoonebutICANNinsidersisprivytothesecretdetailsoftheUSgovernments L  ongoingrelationshipwithICANN,WrongTurnarguedinthealternative. 8    ItbeganbylayingoutthecasethatsolongasDoCcontinuestocontroltheroot,thelaw,  ` cognizantofthesubstanceoftherelationshipratherthanfocusingononlytheform,requiresitto  L  regulatetheparticipantsintheDNSviatraditionalAPAprocessesratherthanthroughcontracts  8  andwinks.Weknow,becauseitispublic,atleastpartofthestoryaboutDoCsroleinICANNs $  formation.AndweknowthatatonepointDoCestimatedthatmonitoringandhelpingICANN   wouldrequirethehalf-timededicationoffourorfivefull-timeemployees._J  #  7      _ԀFurther,DoC   testifiedtoCongressthatICANN"consults"withDoCbeforeitsmajordecisions,K  #  8      ׀andthatinat   leastonecaseDoCamendedanICANNdecision.   #  9      ׀Ontherealpolitikside,ICANNverymuch   wantstohavefullcontroloftheroot,andtheUSgovernment,afterinitiallysignalingthatit p wouldtransferfullcontroltoICANN,wasincreasinglywafflingastowhenifeveritwould \ relinquishitscontrol.n4   #  10      ׀Andweknowthatwhilethegovernmentmaintainedthispowerfulclub H overICANNshead,ICANNhadinfactdoneprettymuchwhattheUSgovernmenthadsaid(ina 4 formallynonbindingstatementofpolicy_C   #  11      _)thatICANNshoulddo.These,andmanyotherfacts  p relatedinWrongTurn,indicatedthatdespitetheveneerofarmslengthcontractingtodoresearch  \ ortechnologytransfer,ICANNwasinrealityDoCs_catspaw_,andthatICANNsactionsshould H befairlychargeabletoDoC,forDoCwaseithertheinstigatorofortheconduitforICANNs 4 regulatorydecisions.Thus,thearticleconcludedthatDoCsapprovalofor,insomecases   acquiescenceto,ICANNsactionspursuanttoDoCsatleasttacitinstructionsconstitute  regulatoryactionsthatshouldbetakeninconformitywiththeAPA.WrongTurnalsoargued,  althoughthiswasalogicallyindependentstrandofthearticle,thatthesesamefactsprovidedthe  foundationforastrong,butnotunassailable,casethatICANNisastateactor,inwhichcaseat t leastsomeofitsactivitieswouldbesubjecttothestricturesofthedueprocessclause. `   Ontheotherhand,thepartylinefrombothICANNand,attimes,theUSgovernment, 8  wasthatICANNwasindependentinsubstanceaswellasform.Sincethepublicdidnothaveall $ t thefacts,Icouldnotconclusivelydisprovethisassertion,itseemedimportanttoconsiderthe  ` legalconsequencesofthisclaim,whateverIsuspectedofitsfactualmerits.Whileaprivatebody  L  couldmanagetheDNSifthesystemwereentirelyprivate,R  #  12      ׀fromanadministrativelaw  8  perspectivethereseemedtobesomethingveryfishyabouthavingthegovernmentretainthe $  commandingheightsoftheDNScontroloverthecontentsoftherootandcontractoutthe   managementofthatresourceonaseriesofshorttermagreements,Vh  #  13      ׀whilepubliclywashingits   handsof(mostof)thematter.ItbecameincreasinglyclearthatICANNsdeliberativeprocedures   leftalmosteverythingtobedesired,andthatthepolicyoutputsofthoseprocedureswere   mistakenatbest,selfinterestedatworst.Yet,onthisversionofthefacts,neitherprivatenor p publiclawseemedtoofferaremedytopartiesaggrievedbyICANNsactions.IfICANNreally \ wereasindependentasitclaimed,itcouldnotbeafederalactor,andthereforetherewereno H publiclawremediestobehadagainstit.Ontheprivatelawfront,ICANNcarefullyinsulated 4 itselffromchallengeby,forexample,amendingitsbylawstostatethat"members"who"joined"  p ICANNwerenotinfactmembersunderCalifornianonprofitlaw,W   #  14      ׀thusensuringtheycouldnot  \ bringevenameritoriousderivativeaction. H   Again,thekeymoveinWrongTurnwastofocusonDoCsroleratherthanICANNs.I   wasstruckbythesimilaritiesbetweenDoCsassertedrelationshipwithICANNandthatofthe   DepartmentoftheInteriorandthelocalCoalBoardsinCarterCoal.S   #  15      ׀Itseemedthatifthenon   delegationtoprivatepartiesdoctrineofCarterCoal(asdistinctfromthepublicnondelegation  doctrineofSchechterPoultryT  #  16      )hadanycontinuingvalidity,thenthiswasthecaseforwhichwe   havebeenholdingthatdormant,butneverquitediscarded,doctrineinreserve.Itgoeswithout  sayingthatanyonearguingforarevivalofsomethingcallingitselfanondelegationdoctrineis  arguinguphill,evenifthebestunderstandingofthatdoctrineismorerootedindueprocessthan t instrictseparationofpowers.X|  #  17      ׀IfthenondelegationaspectsofCarterCoalarestillgoodlaw, ` thenIthinkDoCsrelationswithICANNarethatveryrarecasetowhichthedoctrineapplies. L  But,justasthenondelegationdoctrineshistoryisboundupinthestruggleovertheNewDeal, 8  sotodayitislikelythatanynondelegationargumentisgoingtocarrysubstantialpoliticalor $ t constitutionalstructuralbaggage.ThusinWrongTurnImadeapolicyargumentaswellasa  ` legalargument.First,IsuggestedthatdespiteitsseemingdesuetudetheCarterCoalnon  L  delegationdoctrinehadneverbeenformallyrepudiated,andcitedmodernstatecourtdecisions  8  relyingonit.Z0  #  18      ׀Havingestablishedthatthedoctrineatleastremainsavailable,Ithenarguedthat $  ICANNscorporatiststructure,itsinbuiltselfdealingbydesign,andtheregulatorynatureofthe   servicesICANNprovidesforDoC,allcombinetomakeitthatrareandspecialcasetowhichthe   CarterCoalnondelegationdoctrineoughttoapply.GivenICANNsrecentbehavior,that   policyargumentseemsifanythingstrongertoday,  #  19      ׀whilethedoctrinalpictureremains   unchanged.B  #  20       p ЀB. H   AlthoughWrongTurnfocusedonthelegalityofDoCsactionsratherthanICANNs,d   #  21        p JoeSimsandCynthiaL._Bauerly_Ԁ(S&B)seemtotakeallthisverypersonally._<  #  22      _ԀThisisperhaps  understandableas,morethananyoneelse,JoeSimsisresponsiblefortheICANNwehavetoday.  Helaunchedthebodyevenafterhisclient,JonPostel,tragicallydied,andhasthroughhisadvice  andactionsestablisheditssubstanceandstyle.HeandhissubordinateswroteICANNscharter t andbylaws,andthenfrequentlyrevisedthelatter.HehaspresidedatanumberofICANN ` meetings,andremainsbysomeaccountsitsFRUS.,minencegrisUS.,FR.,=.U  #  23      ׀=XXXXFurthermore,sinceICANNs L  inceptiononSeptember30,1998,ICANNappearstohavepaidJoeSimsslawfirmatotalofat 8  least$2,171,283.88inlegalfees._>h  #  24      _ԀIfoneassumesanaveragefeeof$300perhourthatwould $ t workouttomorethan7,200lawyerhours,orwelloverthreefulltimelawyeryears;infactthe  numberislikelytobesubstantiallysmallersincethatfiguremustincluderecoveryofhotels,  internationalairfares,meals,andotherexpenses.Butwhatevertheactualnumberofhoursbilled  andhourlyrates,ICANNnowamountstoasubstantial,valuable,andrecessionproofclient.~   #  25      ׀In t additiontocastingdoubtonthewisdomofthecoursepursuedtodate,wereDoCforcedtorely ` lessonICANNlikelywouldreduceICANNsimportance,anditsneedforexpensivelegal L  advice._N,  #  26      _ 8  #XXX=X>#  ThispersonalrancorinfectsmuchofS&Bscritique.=XXXXS&Bschiefrhetoricaltacticsare  ` obfuscationandconfusion.Forexample,S&Bcallmyomissionofmostofthehistoryofthe  L  Internet"misleading".,  #  27      #XXX=X:D#=XXXXԀ#XXX=XE#=XXXXԀWrongTurndidnotdiscussthelargemajorityofthehistoryof"the  8  Internet"becausethehistoryof"theInternet"atlargeisntterriblyrelevanttotheissueofDoCs $  legalobligationsregardingitsmanagementoftheDNS,exceptinabackgroundway,justasfor   thesamereasonsitleftoutthehistoryofcomputation,ofcapitalism,andoftheUnitedStates,all  ofwhicharealsopartofthebackground.#XXX=XE#=XXXXYes,muchof"theInternet"thedevicesusing  TCP/IPandtheprogramsrunningonthosedeviceswasatallrelevanttimesprivate.Yes,the  WorldWideWebwascreatedandopen_sourced_ԀbyTim_Berners_ԄLee.So?ManyInternet t services,theWebamongthem,arelayersabovetheDNS.#XXX=XH#=XXXXThathasnothingtodowithICANN ` becauseICANNdoesnt(yet)haveanyfunctionsrelatingtotheworldwideweb.ICANNs L  jurisdictionislimitedtotheDNSandtoIPnumbering.Andthosefunctions,especiallythe 8  regulatoryfunctions,were,formanyyearspriortoICANN,performedbytheUSGovernmentor $ t byitscontractors,primarilyJonPostelandhisassociates.  `   ArelatedrhetoricaldevicefrequentlyusedbyS&Bistheattackonthestrawman.#XXX=XI#The  8  problembeginsintheirsubtitle,whichtakesaimatacontention("ICANN.._Violate[s_]the $  APA")notfoundinWrongTurn.  #  28      ׀IaskthereadertolookinS&BforcitationstoWrongTurn   forwhereImsupposedtohavesaidhalfthethingsS&Bputinmymouth.Reader,youwillnot   findthem,oftenbecausetheydontexist.Hh  #  29      ׀Thatsaseriousfailureinanacademicarticle   (especiallyonethatclaimstobearesponsetosomething),aliteraryformwherepoundingthe   tableisconsideredapoorsubstituteforpoundingfactsandlaw,anditisafailurethataself p respectinglawjournalshouldnothaveallowed. \   Iwouldstophere,wereitnotforthefearthatsomeone,perhapsputoffbythelengthof 4 WrongTurn,mightreadS&Baloneanddecidethattheabsenceofamoredetailedrebuttalwasin  p somewaytoacquiescetoit.  \ [ roadmap ?] 4  1FactualfoundationofICANN,andofICANNsauthority     S&BsaccountofICANNsformationandoperationglossesovercrucialdetailsrelating  tothesourceofICANNscoercivepowers.ICANNhasenormouspoweroverregistrarsand l registriesfortworeasons:theUSgovernmentssupport,andtherootserveroperatorssdesireto X  avoidsplittingtherootforfearoftechnicalchaosadesirethatmeansallrootserveroperators D! feelastrongpressuretoactinconformitywiththeUSgovernment,sinceitcontrolsasubstantial 0"  minorityoftherootserversitself. #l!   ThereisnoquestionthattheideaofanICANNlikebodyhadimportantsupporterswhen $D # itwasformed,andthatithasasomewhatdifferentbutnotinconsiderablesetofsupporterstoday. %0!$ Intellectualpropertyinterestsandsomeimportantforeign,andespeciallyEuropean,governments &"% concernedaboutUSdominanceoftherootbelongtobothgroups.Buttherewerealsoatall  timesimportantdissenters,_^  #  30      _ԀandevenDoCitselfforcedICANNtoamenditsbylawstoprovide  forgreaterenduserinfluence(althoughICANNhastodatemanagedtoputoffimplementation  ofthiscommitmentinameaningfulwayu  #  31      ).Inthislight,itisparticularlyironictohearS&B t suggestingthatICANNspowersaremerelytheproductofsomeconsensus,wheninfactithas ` beencontroversialfromthedayitssecretlyconstitutedunelectedinitialBoardwasfirstrevealed L  tothepublic.r  #  32      ׀ICANNdidnotspringfromthewaveslikeVenus,norlikeAthenafromthebrow 8  ofZeus.Itcameperilouslyclosetobeingtheproductofacabal,howeverwellintentioned.Had $ t JonPostellived,thetrusthehadearned,andtheideathattheorganizationexistedprimarilyto  ` providehimwithpoliticalandlegalcover,wouldhavemostlikelycarriedtheday.Butitwasnot  L  tobe.JonPostelsuntimelydeathrobbedICANNofbothguidanceanditschiefsourceof  8  legitimacybeforebirth.AsaresultICANNsrelevance,andprobablyitssurvival,depended $  criticallyonthesupportoftheUSgovernment.     S&Bassertthat"mostknowledgeableobservers"notonesinglecitationfollows   agreethatICANNsauthorityisutterlyindependentoftheUSgovernment.h  #  33      ׀Theyareso   persuadedoftheselfevidenttruthofthisassertionthattheyneglecttodocumentit,andsuggest  thatanyonewhodisagreesis"makingitup".  #  34      ׀ThewillingnessofICANNpartisanstomakesuch  breathtakinglyfalsestatementsisthereasonwhyIputsomanyfootnotesinWrongTurn.    RoleoftheUSGovernment  `   ThecentralityoftheUSgovernmentssupporttoICANNiseasilydemonstrated.First, 8  theUSgovernmentretainscontroloverthecontentoftheauthoritativeroot.+|  #  35      ׀Thus,itremains $ t theultimateauthorityforanyonewishingtocreateanewTLDandforanyonewishingtoupdate  ` informationpertainingtoanexistingTLD.TheUSgovernmentscurrentpolicyis,inmost  L  cases,0  #  36      ׀tofollowICANNsrecommendationsregardingchangestotheroot._  #  37      _ԀICANNspower  8  hereisthuswhollyderivative.EveryfeethatICANNcollectsfromregistriesorwouldbe $  registriesisduetothisdelegationfromtheDepartmentofCommerce.WeretheUSgovernment   totakeonthisfunctiondirectly,orchoosetorelyonadifferentthirdpartytomakethedecisions   astowhatchangesshouldbeproposedfortherootfile,noonewouldhaveanyinterestin   ICANNsviewsonthematter,norwouldgTLDregistriespayICANNadime.14   #  38      ׀     ICANNsUSgovernmentcreatedpowerovergTLDregistriesinturncreatesapower \ overregistrars.SincegTLDregistrarsneedaccesstoICANNapprovedgTLDregistries,andthe H ICANNregistrieshaveagreedtoonlyacceptregistrationsfromICANNaccreditedregistrars,the 4 registrarswhowishtoselldomainnamesthatworkeverywheremustsignagreementswith  p ICANN.Intheseagreements,theyagreetoimposetermsofserviceontheirclientsthatincludes  \ theUDRP._|   #  39      _ԀBeforeICANNimposedthisrequirement,registrarscompetedonbasicservice H termsincludingtheirsolicitudefortrademarkinterests;nowtheycannot._sd  #  40      _     WhileICANNsdelegatedpowerfromDoCsufficedtoinduce,evencoerce,payments  fromthoseinterestedinnewgTLDs  #  41      ׀andthoseinterestedinregisteringnamesinbotholdand t newgTLDs,itdidnotatfirstsufficetomotivatethelevelofpaymentsICANNsoughtfrom ` incumbentTLDregistries.BothNSI/VeriSign(the.com,.netand.orgregistry)andtheccTLD L  registriesunderstoodthat,forpolitical,legal,andtechnicalreasons,theUSgovernmentwould 8  nottakethemoutoftheroot.Unlikewouldbenewentrants,therefore,theirincentivetopay $ t ICANNwaslimited.SomeforeignccTLDregistriesdidmakevoluntarypaymentstoICANN  ` becausetheywishedittosucceed,seeingitaspreferabletodirectUSgovernmentcontrolofthe  L  root.NeithertheynorNSI/VeriSign,however,werewillingtoundertakecontractualobligations  8  tomakeregularpayments,muchlesstogiveICANNthepowertodeterminethesizeofthe $  levy._i  #  42      _ԀAsIexplainedinWrongTurn,NSIwasonlypersuadedtosignanagreementrequiringto   submittoICANNsrulings,andmakepaymentstoICANN,byintense,direct,USgovernment   pressurebackedbythethreatthatNSIscontracttorunthelucrativeregistrieswasduetoexpire    afterwhichtheUSmighthandthefranchisetosomeoneelse.X  #  43      ׀AsfortheccTLDs,despitefirst   strongarming,andnowacombinationofsoftsoap  #  44      ׀andhardball._|  #  45      _ԀDespitethis,todatetheonly   ccTLDthathassignedICANNsmodelccTLDagreementisthe.auccTLD.Thatappearstobea  quidproquoforICANNforciblyremovingcontrolofthe.auccTLD(inviolationofthe  applicableInternetStandards_m  #  46      _)fromtheprivateoperatortowhomJonPostelhaddelegatedit, t andgivingittoanAustraliangovernmentsponsoredICANNlikebody._!   #  47      _ԀTheonlyotherccTLD ` knowntobeplanningtoagreetoICANNstermsis.us,becauseitssubserviencetoICANNis L  requiredbythe.uscontractrecentlyissuedbytheDepartmentofCommerce._h  #  48      _ 8    S&BpointtothisrecalcitranceonthepartoftheccTLDoperatorsasevidencethat  ` ICANNcouldntpossiblyhavethepowerovertherootthatIascribetoit.q  #  49      Infact,theccTLDs  L  recalcitranceisevidenceofseveralotherthings,notleastthatonlyorganizationswitha  8  governmentbehindthemcanstanduptoICANN.First,itisevidenceofaspecialkindof $  stalemate:sincetheccTLDsarefrequentlyconnectedtotheirgovernments,theyunderstandthat   theyarenotdirectlythreatenedbyICANNbecausetheyknowthattheUSgovernmentwouldnot   removethemfortherootindefianceoftheirlocalgovernmentswishesunderanybutthemost   extremecircumstances.NotonlyistherenoreasonfortheUStodothisandriskthediplomatic   consequences,butamovethatsuggestedtheUSwasflexingitspowerovertherootinawaythat p sothreatenedtheinterestsofothernationswouldbeoneofthefewthingsthatcouldcreatea \ nearconsensustomigratetoanewroot. H   TherecalcitranceoftheccTLDsisalsoevidencethatanyclaimofnearunanimousoreven  p consensussupportforICANNiswishfulthinking(althoughIhastentoaddthatmanyccTLDsdo  supporttheconceptofanindependentbodythatismuchlessactivistthanICANN,andatleast  someclearlyseeICANNasalesserevilthantheUSgovernment).Third,it_doevtails_Ԁneatlywith  theaccountIsummarizedabove,anddetailedinWrongTurn,abouthowICANNneededtouse t strongarmtactics,aideddirectlybytheUSgovernment,toreachagreementswiththeregistries.t  #  50      ׀ ` Registrarsknuckledundermuchearlierthanregistriesbothbecausetheregistrarshadlittle L  choice,andbecausetheyhadmoretogain:newTLDsmeannewproducttosell,andtheywere 8  alsoanxioustoseeNSI/VeriSignsnearmonopolyintheregistrarmarketbroken.Some $ t registrarsalsowantedtobreakintotheregistrymarket,whichalsorequirednewTLDs.ICANN  ` seemedtheonlywaytoachievethosegoals.Now,however,somearehavingsecondthoughts.{|  #  51        L    RoleoftheRootServerOperators  $    Completewithitalics,S&BadvancethecontentionthatWrongTurn"ignores...thereally   criticalfactthatanycontrolovertheDNSthroughtherootfileexistsonlybecauseof,and   reliesentirelyon,thevoluntarycooperationoftheotherrootserveroperators.Theauthority   exercisedbytheDOCisthusstewardshipmadepossibleonlybytheconsensusoftheInternet p Community,ratherthancontrol."0  #  52      ׀Indeed,theiroverallcaseforthelegalityofDoCs \ relationshipwithICANNrestsheavilyonthisclaim.Theyuseittosuggest,first,thattheUS H governmentcannotbeaccusedofdelegatingcontrolovertheDNS,sinceDoChas,theysay,no 4 meaningfulcontrolinthefirstplace.  #  53      ׀Secondly,theyargueonthesameprinciplethatICANN  p itselfhasnomeaningfulcontrolovertheDNS,sinceagaintherealcontrolrestsoffstage,inthe  \ handsoftheRootServeroperators,orthenebulous"InternetCommunity."Itfollows,ifneither H DoCnorICANNreallycontrolsanythingofimportance,thattheycannotreallyberegulating,and 4 thattherearenoadministrativelaworconstitutionalissuesofsubstancetodiscusssincethe   wholestructureturnsonindependentvoluntaryactsofprivaterootserveroperators.     Itsoundsgreat.Alas,onlyaverylittleofitistrue.Thetruepartisthis:iftheoperators  ofthetwelveArootserversweretogettogetheranddeclarethathenceforththeywould  collectivelyrelyonarootzonefileoriginatingsomewhereotherthanthefilecurrentlycontrolled l byDoC,thenDoCwouldindeedbecomeirrelevanttotheroot.Thecontinuedrelianceofthe X  rootserveroperatorsisthusabutforcauseofDoCsandthusICANNspowerovertheDNS. D! Trueasthisfactis,thereisalsoareasonwhyitisofalmostnorelevance,andithaseverythingto 0"  dowiththefactthattheUSgovernmentitselfoperatessufficientrootserverstovetoanychange. #l! Thatisinpartwhy,asIexplainedinWrongTurn,JonPostelsfailedattempttotakepersonal $X" controloftherootisanimportantmomentinDNShistory.v  #  54      ׀Iftherehadbeenanylingering  doubtremainingastowhethertheUSgovernmentcontrolledthelegacyroot,w|  #  55      ׀thatmoment  dispelledit.    ThesametwostructuralfeaturesthatkilledJonPostels"experiment"inredirectionofthe ` rootinJanuary,1998woulddoomanysimilarprojectthatdidnothavetheUSgovernments L  endorsement.Theindependentrootserveroperatorswhodonotworkforgovernmentsare 8  amongtheoldguardoftheInternet.Theysubscribestronglytotheview,enunciatedbythe $ t InternetArchitectureBoard,that  ` 8  Toremainaglobalnetwork,theInternetrequirestheexistenceofaglobally  L  uniquepublicnamespace.TheDNSnamespaceisahierarchicalnamespace  8  derivedfromasingle,globallyuniqueroot.Thisisatechnicalconstraintinherent $  inthedesignoftheDNS.Thereforeitisnottechnicallyfeasiblefortheretobe   morethanonerootinthepublicDNS.Thatonerootmustbesupportedbyaset   ofcoordinatedrootserversadministeredbyauniquenamingauthority.  #  56      ׀    Quitesimply,thelastthingintheworldtheRootServerOperatorsaregoingtodoissplitthe   root.Everymemberofthetwelvememberclubhasaneffectivevetoonanymove,sinceanyone p whofailstogoalongensuresthattheattemptedmovewouldresultinasplitandthereforeinsures \ thattheoperatorsfavoringthemoveinprinciplewillforbear. H   Wecomethentothecriticalfact,mentionedinWrongTurn,   #  57      ׀butconvenientlyignoredby  p S&BinordertosupporttheirfairytalestoryofatoothlessICANNandanimpotentDoC:  \ BecausetheUSgovernmentcontrolsasignificantfractionoftherootservers,DoChasan H effectivevetoonanyattempttoswitchtoanewauthoritativerootfile.The"E,""G,"and"H" 4 rootserversareoperatedbyU.S.governmentagenciesandthe"A,""B,"and"L"rootserversare   operatedbyU.S.governmentcontractors._H   #  58      _ԀGiventherootserveroperatorsreluctancetosplit   theroot,threeoutoftwelveismorethanenoughtoserveasaneffectiveveto;andsixoutof  twelvewouldbeenoughtopreventamajorityvoteinfavorofachange.Thus,S&Bsstatement  thatthe"_USG_Ԁhasabsolutelynoabilitytopreventnongovernmentalrootservers(andespecially  thenonUSrootservers)frompointing"toanyrooty  #  59      ׀isartful,onlypartlyaccurateasaformal t matter,andmisseseverythingimportantandrelevantabouttherelationshipbetweenICANNand ` therootserveroperatorsasawhole._   #  60      _ L    S&BsargumentregardingtherootserveroperatorsisespeciallyironicsinceICANNhas $ t beenworkingassiduouslyformorethanayeartotakedirectcontroloftheArootserver(the  ` onethathasthedatacopiedbythetwelverootserverseveryoneelsedependson)._   #  61      _ԀICANNhas  L  alsobeenworkingtogettherootserveroperatorstosignacontractwithit,agoalrecently  8  demotedtothemoreambiguousstatusofaMemorandumofUnderstanding._  #  62      _ԀWhatthetextof $  thatagreementmightbeisasecret,somethingthatthebottomup,consensusbasedandopen  andtransparent|  #  63      ׀ICANNhasnotyetseenfittosharewiththepublic,andpresumablywont  untilitisadonedeal.   2.APAandStateActorIssues  `   Asalegalmatter,ICANNiseither"public"or"private".Inoneformal,andquite 8  important,senseitisobviouslyprivate:ICANNisnotabodycreatedbyCongressindeedone $ t ofthesourcesofthecurrentICANNmessistheabsenceofstatutoryauthorityforDoCs"calling  ` forth"ofICANNanditssubsequentrelationswithit.ThusdespiteS&Bsattempttoputfoolish  L  wordsinmymouth,IneverarguedthattheAPA"appliestoICANN"andS&Bfailtociteto  8  whereIdo.WhatIarguedisbothmoresubtleandmoreplausible:theAPAappliestoDoC,and $  thatimposesconstraintsonDoCsrelationshipwithICANN.   APA     ICANNcanbesubjecttopubliclawconstraints,notablytheConstitutionalrequirementof p dueprocess,ifandonlyifitisastateactor.Beingfoundtobeastateactorrequirestheactorto \ behaveinconformitywiththeConstitution.IarguedinWrongTurnthatICANNshouldbe H foundtobeastateactor,I0  #  64      ׀althoughIalsonotedthattheICANNfactsfallsomewherebetween 4 theleadingcasesonwhatisandisnotastateactor,makingthecaseforstateactorstatus"strong,  p butnotunassailable."_M  #  65      _ԀWrongTurndoesnotaddresswhether,wereICANNtobefoundtobea  \ stateactor,theAPAwouldthenapplytoit._T  #  66      ׀Rather,Iarguedthat"[_i]f_ԀICANNisastateactor,  itsregulatoryactsaredirectlychargeabletoDoC,andneedtocomplywiththeAdministrative  ProceduresAct"`  #  67      ׀becauseDoCsactivitiesmustcomplywiththeAPA.Toputthisin  concreteterms:ifICANNisafederalactor,itfacesdeclaratoryjudgmentactionsclaimingdue t processviolations,andperhapssuitsagainstitsofficersunderBivens._   #  68     _APAbasedlawsuitswill ` nameDoConly.Indeed,onesuchsuit,namingDoCbutnotICANN,wasrecentlyfiledinthe L  EasternDistrictofVirginia.a  #  69      ׀ 8    IdobelievethatwereICANNrequiredtoobservedueprocessinitsdealingswiththose  ` whomitregulatesthiswouldworkaminorrevolution,alltothegood.Butthatargument,for  L  somereason,isnotonethatS&Bseeminclinedtoaddress,perhapsbecausetheyviewtheir  8  missionasICANNszealouscounselasbeingtocarveoutforICANNthemaximumfreedomof $  arbitraryaction.     TheDepartmentofCommerce,ontheotherhand,isverymuchafederalbodyanda   federalactor.ItisalwayssubjecttotheConstitution,andissubjecttotheAPAasandwhenthat   statuteappliestoitsactivities(thereareanumberofthingsDoCdoestowhichtheAPAdoesnot p apply\  #  70      ).ThisistruewhetherornotICANNisastateactor. \ Ї  Thus,theAPAargumentinWrongTurnwasnotthattheAPAappliestoICANNqua  ICANN.Rather,Iarguedsomethingslightlymoresubtleandfarmorelikelytobetrue:solong  asDoCwishestoperformtheregulatoryfunctionsforwhichithasbycontractengagedICANN,  orinsomecasesforwhichICANNbycontractprovidesroughdraftswhicharethenrubber t stampedbyDoC,thenDoC(notICANN)canonlydosoinconformitywiththeAPA.That ` doesntmeanthatICANNis"subjecttotheAPA"  #  71      ׀althoughitisnodoubtconvenientforS&B L  toattackthatstrawman.ItmeansthatifDoCwantstocontinuetodotheregulatorythingsthat 8  itsgotICANNdoingforit,thenDoCmustdosoviatraditionalAPAproceduresforissuing $ t regulations,whetherornotICANNhappenstobeinvolvedinit._b|  #  72      _  `   S&Bsresponsetothis,thecoreofWrongTurnsAPAargument,consistsoffive  8  contradictoryparagraphs.   #  73      ׀Theirfiveassertionsare:(1)thattheAPAappliesonlytoagency $  rulesandregulationsmadepursuanttostatutoryauthority,andsincenostatuteauthorizesDoCs   relianceonICANNtheAPAdoesntapply,l   #  74      ׀and(2)inanycase,whenDoCdecidestomakean   entryintotherootzonethisisneitheradjudicationnorrulemakingbutrathersomethingelse   (whatthatmightbeisnotspecified),   #  75      ׀and(3)"theDOC/ICANN_MOU_Ԁfortheprovisionof   servicesdoesnotmeanthatICANNsactionsarechargeabletotheDOC"becauseagencyactions p in"directingorreviewing"contractorsarenotsubjecttotheAPA  #  76      ;(4)nordoesICANNs \ contracttoperformthesocalled"IANAfunction"forDOCcreateAPAobligationsforthesame H reason  #  77      ;and(5)notwithstandingpointsthreeandfour,"DOChasnotengagedICANNto 4 performservicesonitsbehalf"<  #  78      !Iamnotmakingthisup.  p   \   Thesefivestatementsreducetothreeissues:whetheritistruethat"DOCdoesnot"either  "makerulesoradjudicateindividualrightswithregardtotherootzone"  #  79      ׀andwhether,ifDoC  doeseitherofthosethings,eithertheabsenceofstatutoryauthorizationforthem,ortheexistence  ofcontractualrelationsbetweenDoCandICANNtakethosedecisionsoutoftheAPA. t   ThevarioussuggestionsthatDoCsactionsregardingentriestotherootareneither L  adjudicationsnor_rulemakings_Ԁbutinsteadsomenebulousothercategoryisunsupportedand 8  unsupportable.ItcouldreasonablybeassertedthatDoCsacquiescencetosomeofICANNs $ t decisionsmightnotbethesortofdecisionthattheAPAaddresses,althoughIthinkthisfounders  ` onthefactthattheAPAdoesinclude"failuretoact"aspartofitsdefinitionof"agencyaction."|  #  80      ׀  L  Butnosuchargumentcouldseriouslybemaderegardingchangestothecontentoftherootzone,  8  whichisaconsciousdecisionthatDoCmakesindependentlyandindeedexplicitlyreservesfor $  itself,_0  #  81      _Ԁevenifitalsotriestodisclaimresponsibilityforit.  #  82      ׀Thereasonsforthisaresetoutin   Part_III.C_ԀofWrongTurn,andneednotberepeatedhere.S&BssuggestionthatDoCmightlack   thestatutoryauthorizationtoruntherootisplausible,butratherthanallowingDoCtoignorethe   APAitwouldhavetheeffectofmakingDoCscontractswithICANNultraviresandthusvoid,   whichisprobablynottheresultthatS&Bseektoachieve.OnewonderswhatICANNwillmake p ofitslawyers  Ԁsuggestionthatthegovernmentlackstheauthoritytocontractwithit. \   ThecontractsexceptiontotherulemakingprovisionoftheAPA_p   #  83      _Ԁisamoresubstantial 4 argument,butoneofonlylimitedreachatbest.AsnotedinWrongTurn,theexceptionisusually  p construednarrowly,andtherearereasonswhyitshouldnotapplytothefactsoftheICANN  \ matter.$   #  84      ׀InconsideringthisissueitisparticularlyimportanttodistinguishbetweenDoCs H directionofICANNpursuanttothecontractsandDoC'sactionsorinactionswitheffectsonthird 4 partiesfollowingICANNsactions.DoCsdirectionofICANNisverylikelytofallunderthe   contractsexception.Thus,forexample,asuitseekingtohaveDoCdirectICANNtodo    somethingislikelytofail.Incontrast,onceICANNhasspoken,DoChasdecisionstomake.In  thecaseofchangestotheroot,nothinghappensunlessDoCacts.  #  85      ׀Similarly,whenDoCwishes   tocountermandoramendICANNsdecisions,itdoesso._|  #  86      _ԀFurthermore,asnotedinWrong  Turn,butignoredbyS&B,evenifthecontractsexceptiondidapply,itonlyexcludesthepartsof  theAPArequiringnoticeandcomment;otherparts,notably706whichgivesarightofreview t ofarbitraryandcapriciousagencyactionremainapplicable.Thatrequirementinturnimports ` otherduties,notablytheagencysdutytomakearecordsufficienttoallowthecourttoconduct L  meaningfulreview.   #  87      ׀ 8   StateActor   `   WrongTurnarguedthatICANNshouldbefoundtobeastateactor.AsS&Bnote,  8  severalcourtshaveheldthatNSIisnotastateactor,andthusneithersubjecttodirect $  constitutionalconstraintsnortotheAPA.S&Bwriteasifthisweresomesortofgreat   "_gotcha_."D   #  88      ׀Infact,theNSIcasesarealmostirrelevanttoaseriousanalysisofwhetherICANNis   astateactorandwhetherthegovernmentsrelianceonICANNtoregulateandadjudicate  #  89      ׀inits   steadmayraiseconstitutionalissues.Asthecourtshaverecognized,NSIhewsquitewelltothe   classiccontractormodel.NSIprovidesservices(domainnameregistrationsandregistry p databasefunctions)tothepublicforafee.Atrelevanttimes,someofthesefeeshavebeensetor  approvedbythegovernment.NSIalsoperformed(andstillperformstothisday)theministerial  taskofimplementingDoCsinstructionsregardingthecreationofnewgTLDs.Ithas,froman  earlydatedisclaimedthepowertocreatenewTLDs,andhasneverclaimedthepowertoregulate t otherregistriesor,modulosometoughnearmonopolisticbusinesspractices,registrars.Similarly, ` theNSIpolicieschallengedinthecasesreliedonbyS&BweresetindependentlybyNSI,either L  tominimizeitsliabilityorforotherreasons,andwithouteitherovertorcovertdirectionfromthe 8  UnitedStates._  #  90      _Ԁ $ t   ICANNiscompletelydifferent.Itprovidesnoproducttothegovernmentortothird  L  partiesotherthanregulatoryservices.S&BsattempttoshelterbehindtheNSIcasesflounders  8  ontheobviousfactthatNSIsfunctionwastoactasregistryandregistrar.ICANNdoesneither, $  indeedisprohibitedfromdoingsobyitsbylaws.@  #  91      ׀Rather,ICANNgeneratesrulesthatare   bindingonallregistries,registrars,andalltheirclients,saveonlythosewillingtoforgothe   benefitsofthelegacyroot.CasesaboutNSIsroleasregistrararenotparticularlyapplicableto   ICANNsroleasregulator.Further,NSIwasabletoarguepersuasivelythattotheextentitdid   makeruleswithregulatoryconsequences,e.g.decidingwhatsortofnamesitwouldrefuseto p register,itdiditwithoutconsultationwiththeU.S.government,andwithoutanyformalor \ informalinstructionsfromit.ICANNcouldnevermakesuchaclaimsincemuchofitsinitial H activitiesconsistpreciselyofexecutingthemissionssetoutinthe(formallynonbinding)White 4 Paper,missionswhicharethereasonsforwhichICANNwascreatedandforwhichtheUS  p governmententeredintoagreementswithit.  \   S&BneverthelessseektomaketheNSIcasesrelevantwiththeirassertionthatthecases 4 "areinstructivebecausetheNSI/DOCcontractprovidestheDoCwithfargreatercontrolover   NSIthanthe_MOU_ԀprovidesoverICANN."Asnotedabove,evenifthisistrue(whichis   debatable)itcomparesapplesandoranges.Thegovernmentsclosecontrolandsupervision  over,say,aphotocopyrepairservicethatservicesgovernmentpropertydoesnotturnthatfirmor  itsemployeesintostateactorstowhomthefirstamendmentapplies.Courtsarepreparedtofind  stateaction"whereastatetriestoescapeitsresponsibilitiesbydelegatingthemtoprivate l  parties"_  #  92      _Ԁbutonlywherea"traditionalpublicfunction"isatstake.Thecaseforcallingthe X  managementoftheDNSa"traditionalpublicfunction"isneithernegligiblenorironclad  #  93      ׀but   whilethatmattersgreatlyforadeterminationofNSIsstatusitisoflittlerelevancetoICANNs  status,sincethefunctionthatICANNperformsforDoCisthatofregulationandregulation,  withoutadoubt,isatraditionalgovernmentfunction._|  #  94      _Ԁ t   Inanycase,whileICANNmayhavesomedegreeofautonomyfromtheUSgovernment! L  ourknowledgeofexactlyhowmuchmustawaitthekeyactorsdepositions<  #  95      ׀!ICANNsmajor 8  decisionstakentodateconsistofexecutingtheinstructionsdictatedtoitbythegovernmentinthe  WhitePaper.S&BresttheircaseontheformofthetransactionsICANNisprivately  incorporated,itcouldintheoryactindependently.Buttherealissueforstate/federalactorcases  isnttheform,itsthesubstance. t  3.Nondelegationargument  L    InadvancinganondelegationargumentinWrongTurn,Iwasmuchconcernedtoprove $ t thatICANN"regulates"ratherthanengaginginmere"standardsetting".IfICANNwerelimited  ` tostandardsetting,asitusedtoargue,therelikelywouldbenonondelegationissue.h  #  96      ׀Itis  L  refreshingtoseeS&Badmitwhathas,inanycase,becomeobvious,thatICANN"makespolicy  8  decisionsrelatingto"theDNS.  #  97       $    WrongTurnarguedthatifIwaswrongaboutDoCbeingrequiredtouseAPAprocedures   whencontractingoutforregulatoryservices,thentherewasinsteadaCarterCoalissueabout   nondelegationtoaprivategroup.S&Battempttotrashthisargumentbysayingthatsince   thereisnoCongressionalactiondelegatingpowertomanagetheDNStoDoC,muchless p allowingsubdelegationtoICANN,therecantpossiblybeanondelegationissuesincethe \ doctrine"prohibitsonlyCongressfromdelegatingitslegislativepowertoanyotherentity"._  #  98      _Ԁ H S&BshouldgobackandreadthecasesIreliedon.ThisargumentmightworkifIwererelying 4 onthetraditionalnondelegationdoctrineofSchechterPoultry(althoughitwouldthenraisea  p seriousultraviresquestion).Thesingletermnondelegationactuallyreferstotwoquite  \ differentideas,andIreliedontheotherone,theoneinCarterCoal.Thatidea,thattheremaybe H afundamentalstructuralconstraintonthelegislaturespowertodelegatepublicpowertoprivate 4 groups,alimitsoundinginDueProcess,isonethatcompletelybluntstheirchallenge.Itisindeed   somewhatoddtospeakofasubdelegationofpowerfromDoCtoaprivatepartyasviolating   evenCarterCoalnondelegationintheabsenceoflegislationclearlyallowingit.Onewould  devoutlywishforastatutetoputDoCsrelationwithICANNonalessshakylegalfooting.But  evenwithoutone,its_hornbook_Ԁlawthatagencieshavenoinherentpowers,validlyexercising  onlythepowersdelegatedtothembyCongress.ItsequallyaxiomaticthattheDueProcess  clauseappliestoallthreebranchesofourgovernment.Inlightofthosetwomaxims,itfollows t fairlysimplythatifthereisastructuraldueprocessbartothesubdelegationofpublicpowertoa ` privategroupofthesortdescribedinCarterCoal,thenitappliesatalltimestoallofDoC's L  activities. 8    S&Badvancetheobviousdoctrinalrejoindertomyclaim,thecounterassertionthatthe  ` nondelegationdoctrineisdead,CarterCoaladeadletter.AsnotedinWrongTurn,inlightof  L  thecaselawsincetheNewDeal,thisargumenthasmorethanalittleforce.Academicauthorities  8  tendtobedividedbetweenseeingnondelegationasaresidualdoctrinedeployedtojustify $  limitingconstructionsofpotentiallyoverbroadstatutes_c  #  99      _Ԁandahistoricalrelic.Recognizingthis,I   alsoarguedthattheICANNfactsaresoegregious,theselfdealingsolikethefactsthatprompted   CarterCoal,itselfbyfartheleastobnoxiousofthethreeantiNewDealnondelegationcases,   thatitmakesacaseforwhythedoctrine,evenifthoughttodead,shouldberevivedforthis   limitedpurpose.Interestingly,S&Bchoosetoresttheircaseondoctrinealone,ignoringthe p policyquestionentirelyexcepttoaccusemeofarguingwiththeheart. |  #  100      ׀Yet,inthissortofcase \ thepolicystrandisinseparablefromthedoctrinalone._0  #  101      _ԀWhatoughttobehas,andshouldhave, H influenceonwhat(doctrinally)is.Inanycase,Iamfarfromaloneinexpressingconcernthat 4 'privatization'isbeingusedasacovertoavoidaccountabilityforfundamentallygovernmental  p decisions._x  #  102      _Ԁ  \  4.Factualfoundationof_USGs_Ԁauthorityovertheroot  4   ThequestionofthenatureofDoC'sauthorityovertherootisaninterestingone,andin   theirarticleS&Badvanceanoveltheoryofit.Asnotedabove,partofS&B'sargumentforwhy  ICANNreceivesnodelegatedauthorityfromDoCisthatDoChasnoauthorityovertheDNSto  delegate.HereishowtheycharacterizeDoC'spreICANNrole:  8  =XXXXthe_USG_,preICANN,dependedonthevoluntarycooperationofother  governmentsandDNSinfrastructureoperatorsfortheeffectiveimplementationof t anyinstructionsitgavetoNSItomakechangesintherootzonefile.Thus,the ` onlypractical"power"the_USG_ԀhadavailablefortransfertoICANNwasthe L  administrativeresponsibilityfordeterminingglobalconsensus.Thisisnot 8  governmentalpower.  #  103      #XXX=X}#$ t   S&BprovidenosupportforthisextraordinarysuggestionthattheDoClackedthelegalor  ` practicalauthoritytomakechangesintherootwithouttheapprovalofothers.Andinfactitis  L  nottrueandfliesdirectlyinthefaceoftheposturethatDoChastakeninallofitsstatementsto  8  Congress.ItistruethatbothbeforeandafterICANNtheU.S.government,perhapswiselyor $  perhapsbecauseofitsthralltotrademarkinterests,hasdecidedthatinmostcasesdiscretionwas   thebetterpartofvalor.Evenso,inthe.usdelegation,carriedoutsinglehandedlybytheUS   withoutrecoursetotheICANNprocess,werecentlywitnessedaclearreminderoftheU.S.   government'spower._|  #  104      _     ToseejusthowcredibletheS&BtheoryofzeroUSgovernmentpowerovertherootis, \ oneneedonlyconsiderafewrhetoricalquestions.First,canitseriouslybesuggestedthatthe H WhitePaperwastheonlyoptionlegallyopentothegovernment?DoS&Breallymeanto 4 suggestthatiftheU.S.governmentweretolegislateaboutdomainnamesand/orDoCwereto  p issuealegislativerule,theseactionswouldviolatenationalorinternationallaworsomehow  \ exceedtheUSgovernments"power"?Second,whyisitthatbothICANNandsomeforeign H governmentskeepinsistingthattheUSgovernmentturnoverthecontrolitretainstoICANNif 4 thatcontrolisinfactanemptyset?Or,tobereallybluntaboutit,doesanyonethinkthatifthe   USgovernmentissuesaninstructionregardingtherootfiletoVeriSign/NSIitwouldfailto   implementitregardlessofthepresenceofabsenceofdissentingviewsabroad?OriftheU.S.  governmentweretoexerciseitsrighttoreplaceICANNwithsomeotherentity,  #  105      ׀itwouldbe  actingillegally?    Whateverthejusticeofthematter!andthatisdebatable!theU.S.hasthepowerto X  determineoutcomesrelatingtotheDNS._c  #  106      _ԀAtsomeveryextremepoint,weretheU.S.toabuse D! _thatpower,the'netwouldprobablyperceivethisasintolerabledamageandfindawaytoroute  aroundit.ButtheInternet'stoleranceofthecostsanddamageimposedbyICANNdemonstrate  thatsuchactswillonlybetakeonthemostextremeprovocation.@  #  107      ׀   5.Awayforward  `   Onewaytoperpetuateyourselfistopersuadeothersthat_aprs_Ԁmoiledeluge.ICANN 8  hastradedheavilyonthisfear,andIsuspectthatitaccountsforagooddealofitscurrent $ t support.S&Badvanceaversionofthisline,suggestingthat"ifthisexperimentisnotsuccessful,  ` theonlypracticalalternativeissomeformofmultinationalagencyorauthority."  #  108      ׀Personally,I  L  don'tagreethattheonlyalternativetotheICANNwehaveisaworldtreatybody.Itispossible  8  toimaginewhatagoodICANNwouldlooklike. $    Today,ICANN'sprocesseslittleresembleeitherstandard-makingortechnical   coordination.Todate,ICANN's"standardmaking"hasproducednostandards.ICANN's   "technicalcoordination"hasbeenneithertechnicalnorhasitcoordinatedanything.Rather,inits   initialforayintothecreationofnewgTLDs,ICANNhasactedlikeaverybadlyorganized p administrativeagency.Insteadofengaginginstandardswork,ICANNisinsteadengagedin \ recapitulatingtheearlyproceduralerrorsoffederaladministrativeagenciessuchastheFederal H CommunicationsCommission(FCC).  #  109       4   Whatrealstandard-makingwouldlooklike   \   Astandard-based(or,atleast,standardized)approachtogTLDcreationwouldrequired 4 ICANNtocraftapre-announced,open,neutral,andobjectivestandardofcompetenceratherthan   topickandchooseamongtheapplicantsonthebasisoftheICANNBoard'svagueand   inconsistentideasofaestheticmerit,marketappeal,capitalization,orexperience.Allapplicants  meetingthatstandardwouldbeaccepted,unlessthereweresomanythatthenumberthreatened  todestabilizetheInternet.\   #  110      ׀ICANNmightalsoputinreasonablelimitsonthenumberofTLDs  perapplicant,andonsequencing,inordertokeepallofthemgoingonlinethesameday,week,or l monthorevenyear.    Underastandards-basedapproachICANNwouldhavetriedtoanswerthesequestionsin  theabstract,beforetryingtoholdcomparativehearingsinwhichitattemptedtodecidetowhich t ofspecificapplicantsitshouldallocateanewgTLDregistry: `  A(sx3"A3"  A32s"3  0    Whatistheminimumstandardofcompetence(technical,financial,whatever)tobefound L  qualifiedtorunaregistryforagiventypeofTLD?A3݌8 (#(# Ќ  "A3"  A32s"3  0    Whatopen,neutral,andobjectivemeansshouldbeusedtodecideamongcompeting $ t applicantswhentwoormorewould-beregistriesseekthesameTLDstring?A3D݌ `(#(# Ќ  "A3"  A3|2s"3  0    WhatarethetechnicallimitsonthenumberofnewTLDsthatcanreasonablybecreatedin  L  anorderlyfashionperyear?A3|݌ 8 (#(# Ќ  "A3"  A32s"3  0    Whatopen,neutral,andobjectivemeansshouldbeusedtodecideamongcompeting $  applicants,ortosequenceapplicants,ifthenumberofapplicantsmeetingthequalification   thresholdexceedsthenumberofgTLDsbeingcreatedinagivenyear?A3݌ (#(# Ќ  Today,reasonablepeoplecouldnodoubtdisagreeonthefinedetailsofsomeofthesequestions,   andperhapsonalmosteveryaspectofothers.Resolvingtheseissuesintheabstractwouldnot   necessarilybeeasy.Itwould,however,bevaluableandappropriateworkforanInternet p standardsbody,andwouldgreatlyenhancecompetitioninalltheaffectedmarkets. \   Oncearmedwithasetofstandardsanddefinitions,ICANNoranyotherallocationbody, 4 wouldbeonstronggroundtorejecttechnicallyincompetentorotherwiseabusiveapplicationsfor  p newgTLDs,suchasthoseseekinganunreasonablylargenumberofTLDs.Athoughtfulanswer  \ wouldinevitablyresolveanumberofdifficultquestions,notleastthetermsonwhichamarriage H mightbemadebetweentheDepartmentofCommerce's"legacy"rootandtheso-called"alternate" 4 roots.     Whattechnicalcoordinationwouldlooklike     AnalternateapproachtogTLDcreation,onethatwouldmostcertainlyenhance  competition,wouldtakeitsinspirationfromthefundamentaldesignoftheInternetitself-andfrom l majorleaguesports.TheInternetwasdesignedtocontinuetofunctioneveniflargepartsofthe X  networksustaineddamage.Internetnetworkdesignavoids,wheneverpossible,thecreationof D! singlepointsoffailure.Whenitcomestopolicy,however,ICANNiscurrentlyasinglepointof 0"  failureforthenetwork.AsolutiontothisproblemwouldbetoshareoutpartofICANN'scurrent #l! functionstoavarietyofinstitutions. $X"   Inthisscenario,ICANNwouldbecomeatruetechnicalcoordinationbody,coordinating %0!$ theactivitiesofalargenumberofgTLDpolicypartners,whowouldbedrawnfromawide &"% varietyofinstitutionsincluding_NGO_'s,corporations,intergovernmentalandregionalbodies,and '#& professionalsocieties.  #  111      ׀ICANN'sfunctionswouldbe: (#'   (1)tokeepamasterlistofTLDs; )$(   (2)toensurethattherewereno'namecollisions'-tworegistriesattemptingtomangethe  sameTLDstring;    (3)tofixanannualquotaofnewgTLDs;    (4)torunanannualgTLDdraft; t   (5)tocoordinatethegTLDcreationprocesssothatnewgTLDscameonstreaminan ` orderlyfashioninsteadofallatonce L    (6)toensurethatregistrieskeptorprovidedaproperbackupor"escrow"ofcriticaldata. 8    EachofICANN'spolicypartnerswouldbeassignedoneormoredraftchoices,andthen  ` ICANNwouldrandomly(or,perhaps,otherwise)assigneachonetheirdraftpicks.Aseachpolicy  L  partner'sturncameup,itwouldbeentitledtoselectaregistry-imposingwhateverconditionsit  8  wished-tomanageanygTLDthathadnotyetbeenclaimedonICANN'smasterlist.Inkeeping $  withthetransnationalandpublic/privatenatureoftheInternet,ICANN'spolicypartnerscouldbe   ahighlydiversemixofinternational,national,andprivate"civilsociety"bodies.     WhileIthinkthisalternatesolutionwouldbestachievetheendsofinternationalization,   competition,anddiversity,itmightwellrequirelegislationsinceitisuncleariftheDepartmentof p Commercehasthewill(ortheauthority)toimplementsuchaplan,andwehaveseennosignthat \ ICANNisabouttodivestitselfofanypolicyauthorityunlessforcedtodoso. H   ICANNfacesachoice:Ononepathitbecomesatruestandardsbody,oratruetechnical  p coordinationbody,andleavesthesocialpolicychoicestothose-likeCongress-whohavethe  \ legitimacytomakethem.Ontheotherpath,theoneitcurrentlyseemstobefollowing,itisastate H actor.Inthatcase,itsactionstodatehavebeenfartooarbitrarytosurvivejudicialreview. 4   ICANN'snaturecurrentlytendstofunctioncreepwhichemphasizestheneedfor   democraticlegitimacy.Yet,themechanicsforprovidingthislegitimacyviathesortofelection  ICANNcouldrundonotexist,indeedmaybeimpossible,andtheverycrabbedandlimited  proposalsthatICANNispreparedtoapprovearesubstantiallyunequaltothetask.Furthermore,  representationstructuresthatincreaselegitimacyforICANN'snewfunctionsintroduceobstacles l !democracy!totheadoptionofnewpolicies,obstaclesthattheICANNstaffisdeterminedto X  prevent(indeed,italreadyroutesaroundsomeoftheonesthatexist).Streamliningoperations D! reduceslegitimacybutincreasesefficiency!enablingfurtherfunctioncreepandincreasingthe 0"  legitimationdeficit.Andoncetheyareentrenched,astheynoware,theverynonrepresentative #l! structuresthatenablefunctioncreepcanbeusedtoblockrepresentation. $X"   %0!$ Conclusion     DespiteS&Bsattentiontostrawmen,themainissuefromanadministrativeandpublic  lawperspectiveisnotICANNbutDoCsrelianceonICANN.DoCreliesonICANNtoadviseit, t andtotakesetsofdecisionsthattheWhitePapersuggestedDoCdesires,butthatDoCdoesnot ` choosetotakedirectly.WhenDoCallowsICANNsdecisionstogoforwardwithout L  countermand,andmostclearlywhenDoCitselfactsonICANNsadvice,DoCcommitsthesort 8  ofagencyactionthattheAPAandtheConstitutionexisttoconstrain.AndifDoCsattitudeisso $ t completelyhandsoffthatitdeferstoICANNwithoutconsideringthesubstanceofICANNs  ` decisions,thenwehavereachedapointwherethereiscausetoreawakentheslumberingnon  L  delegationtoprivatepartiesdoctrine,oratleasttoembarkonanopendiscussionofthe  8  implicationsfordemocraticaccountabilityinthemodernadministrativestateifweallowagencies $  tocontractwithICANNlikebodiestomakedefactoregulationsforthem.z  #  112           Itdidnothavetocometothis.ICANNcouldhavechosenadifferentstructure.Alas,   givenwherewearetoday,itseemsunlikelythatICANNitselfhasanincentivetoturnitselfintoa   leaner,better,lesscentralizedorganization.Nordoesitseemlikelythatpubliclawisatoolthat p cancompelthisresult._T  #  113      _ԀICANN,aformallyprivateCalifornianonprofitorganization,hasno \ legalobligationtobedemocraticallyaccountableevenifitisafederalactor,itsdutiesrunto H dueprocessnotrepresentationordecentralization.Nor,despitethetitleofS&Bsarticle,does 4 WrongTurnarguethattheAPAappliesdirectlytoICANN.  p   TheUSgovernmentcouldhavechosenadifferentrelationshipwithICANN.Wehave H availableworkableandclearlyconstitutionalmodelsofhowanagencyinteractswithaself 4 regulatoryorganization(SRO).TheSECsrelationshipwithstockexchangesprovidesone   model.There,pursuanttostatute,theagencyretainstherighttoregulate,butinmostcasesthe   SROregulatesitsownmembers.Beforeimportantrulesgointoeffect,thoserulesaresubmitted  totheagencyforitsreview,andbytheagencyforpubliccomment.Asapracticalmatterthe  agencysapprovalisusuallylittlemorethanarubberstamp,buttheproceduralhurdleservesthe  importantfunctionsofdiscouragingtheSROfromproposingabusiverulesandprovidingan l avenueforjudicialreviewifoneslipsthrough.Butsucharelationshipwouldhaverequired X  authorizinglegislation,andforthisneithertheClintonadministration,norICANNatanytime, D! hadanydesire. 0"    InchoosinghowtodecideanyAPAorpubliclawcontroversyspawnedbyDoCsreliance $X" onICANN,areviewingcourtwillalmostinevitablybeforcedtonavigatebetweenformand $D # substance.Leavingasidetheirexaggerationsandmisrepresentations,S&Bsargumentseemsto  bethatweshouldcloseourmindstothickdescriptionandlettheformscontrol:ICANNis  private.TheWhitePaperwasjustapolicystatementofnolegalimport.DoCsrelationshipwith  ICANNisoneofcontract.Andthecontractsdontseemtosaymuch.Thirdpartiesarenotin t privitywith,arenotinvolvedin,issuesofpowerovertheroot.Indeed,thatpoweritselfis ` chimeralsincelargepartsofitdonotrestonlegalformalities.Dontrocktheboat. L    Asapositivematter,itisnotimpossiblethatacourtmightindeedadopttheformalistic $ t view.  #  114      ׀Butitwouldbeanavoidableerror.AsIsoughttodetailinWrongTurn,andtosuggest  ` inthisessay,oneneednotlookveryfarunderneaththesurfacetodiscoverthatthesubstanceof  L  DoCrelationshipwithICANNismateriallydifferentfromwhatitmayappeartobefromthe  8  formsalone.Lookalittlebeyondtheforms,totheactualmeansbywhichDoCcanandon $  occasiondoesexercisecontrolovertheroot,theextenttowhichDoCkeepsICANNonashort   leash,andtheconsequencesthatwouldflowwereDoCtoderecognizeICANNandinstead   recognizeanotherbodyinitsplace,andyoubegintoseethingstowhichJoeSimsandCynthiaL.   _Bauerly_Ԁseemtohaveclosedtheireyesverytightlyindeed.