Assignments for the Week of Sept. 8:
With respect to Section II.A.2.a.iii, consider:
- We will discuss some hypotheticals relating to tacking and disability:
- Consider the following sets of events in a state with a 12-year adverse possession statute of limitations. Who would prevail in each situation:
- First set:
- 2012: A occupies Blackacre, land belonging to T.
- 2022: A conveys “all my interest in Blackacre” to B
- 2025: T sues to eject B.
- Second set:
- 2012: A occupies Blackacre, land belonging to T.
- 2022: B ejects A.
- 2025: T sues to eject B.
- Third set:
- 2012: A occupies Blackacre, land belonging to T.
- 2022: T sells Blackacre to T1.
- 2025: T1 sues to eject A.
- Consider the following events. How would they come out under the statute at CB 149?
- First Scenario:
- 1991: T is sentenced to 30 year years in prison (and begins serving the sentence).
- 1992: AP occupies land belonging to T.
- 2020: T is released from prison.
- 2025: T sues to eject AP.
- Second Scenario:
- 1991: AP occupies land belonging to T.
- 1992: T is sentenced to 30 year years in prison (and begins serving the sentence).
- 2022: T is released from prison.
- 2025: T sues to eject AP.
- Third scenario
- 2011: T enlists in army, is sent to Iraq, then Afghanistan, and later back to Iraq.
- 2012: AP occupies T’s land.
- 2022: T returns from Iraq, having left the Army.
- 2025: T sues to eject AP.
- How should Problems 1 & 2 on CB 149 be resolved?
- Should there be a disability exception in an adverse possession statute?
- Howard v. Kunto:
- It would be a good idea to draw your own schematic plat of the lots, and in each lot write out the facts of the title (transfers of title and current record ownership).
- Was the Kuntos’ use of the property in Howard v. Kunto “continuous”? What about the camping hypothetical at CB 148 (Question 3)?
- How did the Court of Appeals of Washington deal with the fact that the Kuntos, who claimed adverse possession, had been there only a year? Why did the trial court not count towards the required 10 year period the time that the McCalls, Millers, and other previous occupants had lived on the lot?
- How did the tacking issue in Howard v. Kunto differ from the tacking issues above? In this regard, make sure you understand the Buchanan v. Cassell case, discussed by the court at CB 147.
- Formulate the Washington Supreme Court’s holding on this issue in your own words:
- Using the word privity
- Not using the word privity
- Rather than deal with adverse possession, why not just stick to the record titles as determining ownership, and hold the surveyor liable to the Kuntos for professional malpractice?
- What accounts for the variation in state law regarding whether adverse possession can run against the government? What do you think the law should be?
Tuesday, September 9: If need be, we will complete our discussion of the material in Section II.A.2.a.iii, and then move on to Sections II.A.2.a.iv and II.A.2.b.i.
With respect to Section II.A.2.a.iv, consider the relative hardship or “improving trespasser” doctrine described at (Supp. 53-54):
- Should the actual title holder to the lot in Ocean Hammock be able to compel the Vosses to remove the house on the title holder’s lot? See Supp. 55. What about getting full ownership of the house for free, as an improvement to the lot? Or getting full ownership of the house for free, but only upon payment to the Vosses of the market value of the house? Assume that both the builder (Keystone) and the surveyor have gone bankrupt and had no insurance.
- In the Hawaii situation, Supp. 56-57, why was Anne Reynolds unwilling to accept another identical lot in exchange for hers (on which the developer, Keaau Development Partnership, mistakenly built a home? What is your reaction to the concern expressed by the developer’s attorney that Reynolds might be “trying to exploit PJ Construction’s mistake in order to get money from my client [the developer] and other parties”? What other factors would you want to take into account? Note that it was subsequently reported that a court had ordered the house on her lot to be torn down.
With respect Section II.A.2.b.i (the Florida Adverse Possession Statute), consider:
- Imagine the following set of facts in Florida:
- Blackacre is a 50-acre property in the Redlands (an agricultural area in Miami-Dade County). Blackacre is bounded on the north by a road and on the south by a canal.
- Blackacre has been unused for a number of years. The title holder, T, lives in Georgia and has not visited it or used it in many years. The east and west sides have an old decrepit wooden fence that is rotted in a number of places and has some gaps.
- In January 2018, AP enters the lot with the idea of farming it. AP puts a sign up on the lot saying “AP Farms.” A camping aficionado, AP camps there for a number of nights, generally leaving her tent and other camping equipment on site when not camping.
- In December 2018, AP starts farming Blackacre.
- AP plants tomatoes on 40 acres.
- AP begins construction of a house, barn, storage units for equipment, and a farmers market over the other 10 acres. Over the ensuing years, AP farms Blackacre and runs a farmers market on it.
- In August 2025, T is in Miami for business. He reads a story in the Miami Herald detailing how The Farmers Market at AP Farms™ has been a South Florida hit over the years. Neighboring farmers are quoted as saying they’re impressed at what AP has accomplished with her property. T visits The Farmers Market at AP Farms™ to buy some fruit. To his dismay T realizes that AP Farms is Blackacre.
- In September 2025, T brings a lawsuit to eject AP.
- How would this dispute be resolved under the Florida statute?
- How would this dispute be resolved if the facts took place not in Florida, but in Washington State (where Chaplin v. Sanders was decided)?
- How would you analyze the facts of Howard v. Kunto under the Florida statute?
- Please be prepared to discuss the question at Supp. 65, left hand column (end of note 2) about the 2013 amendment to the statute.
Thursday, September 4: We will continue our discussion of the material in Section II.A.2.b.i, and move on to
Section II.A.2.b.ii.
With respect to Section II.A.2.b.ii, consider:
- Be prepared to discuss the questions raised in the readings at Supp. 66(starting at note 3)-69, and the Seton case (Supp. 70-72, and the questions on it at Supp. 68-69).
- Do you think the law should permit acquisition of border strips through adverse possession?
- Note that even where adverse possession cannot be established with respect to a border strip, other doctrines (discussed at CB 143) may apply. Does that affect your answer to the preceding question? Also, do you think that the Florida statute would bar application of these common law doctrines to a contested border strip? Why might it? Why might it not?
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